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The National Environmental Policy Act of 1960 (NEPA) initiated the study and 
practice of environmental impact analysis.  Upon passage, NEPA transformed the process 
in which the federal government plans, seeks input on, and documents major projects of 
environmental significance.  While NEPA has surely affected project-level incremental 
actions, its rational comprehensive mandate as expressed in Title II of the statute has 
remained largely unfulfilled.  Neglect of Title II has occurred as a result of broad 
language in NEPA that is difficult for federal judges to interpret and administrators to 
implement.  Political interference with the President’s Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) has also undermined efforts to implement the provisions of Title II. 
Despite limited success in implementing Title II of NEPA, the need for 
comprehensive environmental monitoring and reporting persists.  A decade-long series of 
policy reports from specialists both in and out of government has called for a national 
ecological indicator system.  Analysis of these proposals demonstrates a clear need for 
coordination in ecological information.  What these reports do not suggest, however, is a 
clear institutional home for comprehensive environmental efforts.  While CEQ may be 
the logical home by statute, it competes with EPA for these responsibilities. 
  
If CEQ is to restore its comprehensive mandate, it must develop a comprehensive 
product that differentiates itself from the efforts of EPA.  This product must be science-
based, but also accessible to the public and decision-makers without expert knowledge of 
environmental science.  It must relate to fundamental components of a future, 
comprehensive ecological indicator system, yet also incorporate new methods of 
environmental accounting such as Ecological Footprinting.  The product must be low-
cost, easily updateable, and scalable to local, state, regional, and national efforts.  Most 














TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE ................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2: CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY OF NEPA ......................................................................... 5 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF NEPA TO NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ......................................................... 5 
FOUR CURRENT NEPA PERSPECTIVES ......................................................................................................... 9 
AN INITIAL SUBSTANTIVE MANDATE .......................................................................................................... 12 
SHIFT FROM SUBSTANTIVE TO PROCEDURAL INTERPRETATION ................................................................... 14 
POSITIVE LAW AND NEPA .......................................................................................................................... 16 
ALTERNATE NEPA PROCESSES AND THE FUTURE ...................................................................................... 17 
CHAPTER 3: NEPA ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY AND THEORY ............................................... 23 
PLANNING AND POLICY THEORETICAL MODELS .......................................................................................... 23 
Rational Comprehensive Model ............................................................................................................ 23 
Incremental Model ................................................................................................................................ 26 
Mixed-Scanning Model ......................................................................................................................... 28 
CEQ HISTORY ............................................................................................................................................ 31 
FEDERAL REPORTS ELIMINATION AND SUNSET ACT OF 1995 ...................................................................... 36 
BOUNDS TO NEPA RATIONAL-COMPREHENSIVE INTENT .............................................................................. 38 
CHAPTER 4: NATIONAL ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS AND THE CALL FOR 
COMPREHENSIVENESS ......................................................................................................................... 42 
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FOCUS (1997-2003) ....................................................................................... 44 
National Science and Technology Council............................................................................................ 44 
Heinz Center .......................................................................................................................................... 47 
National Research Council .................................................................................................................... 51 
Environmental Protection Agency......................................................................................................... 53 
INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL FOCUS (2004-2007) .................................................................................. 54 
Government Accountability Office ....................................................................................................... 54 
CEQ Interagency Working Group ......................................................................................................... 57 
National Academy of Public Administrators ......................................................................................... 58 
CURRENT STATUS AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................ 61 
CHAPTER 5: A PROPOSAL FOR NATIONAL IMPACT ANALYSIS ............................................... 64 
A POSSIBLE CEQ COMPREHENSIVE PRODUCT AND ITS FEATURES ............................................................... 65 
INTEGRATION OF ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINT ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 66 
RELEVANCE OF INFORMATIONAL PRODUCT TO TITLE I & II ........................................................................ 71 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES ........................................................ 75 
REFERENCE LIST .................................................................................................................................... 79 
APPENDIX A: THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 ............................... 83 
APPENDIX B: SUMMARY MATRIX OF ECOLOGICAL INDICATOR PROPOSALS, 
1997-2007 ..................................................................................................................................................... 91 
APPENDIX C: SELECTED ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINTS BY INCOME GROUP, 
REGION, AND NATION ........................................................................................................................... 92 
 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Purpose 
 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) is an ambitious 
statement of national environmental intent.  NEPA encourages responsible decision 
making on federal projects of environmental significance by requiring an informed, open, 
and interdisciplinary process for reaching decisions.  NEPA’s action forcing mechanism 
— the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as outlined in Section 102(c) of Title I of 
the act — is the primary operative component of the Act and the means for achieving this 
open, informed process.  More broadly and boldly, NEPA intended not only a policy shift 
in federal activity and administration, but also the creation of a new national 
environmental ethic (Bear 2003, 932).  This ethic is comprehensive in character, viewing 
the environment as composed of complex and interrelated systems.  This ethic is wary of 
reductionism and the tendency to frame environmental health in terms of specific 
pollutants or species.  The ethic encompasses issues of economic growth, resulting 
depletion of resources, and intergenerational equity.  To direct and report on the federal 
government’s progress toward these ideals, Title II of NEPA created the President’s 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), a new administrative body in the Executive 
Office of the President (EOP). 
NEPA’s lofty policy goals are grounded in a process of rational expert analysis 
(Bartlett, R.V. 1986a, 1986b, 1999).  NEPA intends that once a process of informed, 
public analysis has been completed, agency managers will be persuaded to consider 
project alternatives with the least environmental impact.  At a minimum, agency 
managers will feel public pressure to justify decisions that have negative impacts.  NEPA 
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also presumes that CEQ leadership will be willing and able to advocate the institutional 
priorities of CEQ above the political priorities of the President.  Like agency impact 
assessment, much of CEQ’s mandate in Title II is dependent on the degree to which it 
can be rationally administered by a cadre of politically-detached experts. 
Forty years after its passage, NEPA is still wrestling with its lofty intentions and 
the challenges inherent in comprehensive environmental policy.  NEPA principles are 
inspiring to those who share a reverence for the global ecosystem.  To those who do not 
share the same priorities, NEPA principles may ring hollow and fail to compel the 
minimization of environmental impacts.  While NEPA does not require positive 
environmental outcomes by law, it surely hopes to foster them.  If NEPA is to maintain 
relevance over the next forty years, it must be acknowledged that NEPA’s reliance on a 
process of rational, politically-detached analysis has at times not produced the results 
envisioned by NEPA’s drafters.  As with other policies and plans, practice complicates 
theory. 
With an acceptance of both NEPA’s achievements and criticisms in mind, it is 
appropriate to analyze the impediments to NEPA’s rational comprehensive planning 
orientation that have evolved during forty years of implementation.  This analysis is 
necessary if NEPA is to play a future role in safeguarding our Nation’s environment. 
Impediments to implementation of NEPA’s policy intent exist in three primary 
areas: legal, administrative, and informational.  Political concerns intertwine all three.  
These impediments have received treatment primarily in law, planning, and policy theory 
scholarship.  Empirical analyses of NEPA effectiveness are extremely scarce, presumably 
due to the size and complexity of NEPA documents.  The analytical unmanageability of 
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NEPA documents and its resulting void of study are symptoms of NEPA’s legalistic 
implementation. 
While empirical study of NEPA remains to be attempted, much can still be gained 
through critical analysis and synthesis of various qualitative data sources related to 
NEPA.  This research effort will utilize such sources to examine the role of CEQ in 
fulfilling NEPA’s comprehensive planning and policy charge represented in Title II.  
Two primary research questions are the focus of this work.  The first question is: “What 
impediments prevent the achievement of NEPA’s rational comprehensive focus?”  The 
second question is, “How might NEPA resume this comprehensive focus?”  Content 
analysis of legal case studies, legislation, and policy research are used to answer both 
research questions. 
 Chapter Two provides a concise legal history of NEPA.  This history 
demonstrates that much of NEPA implementation has occurred incrementally through 
various court decisions in the federal judiciary.  The resulting body of NEPA case law 
reflects the difficulty courts have had in identifying and enforcing operative components 
of the larger Act. 
 Chapter Three presents an analysis of NEPA’s administrative history in the 
context of planning and policy theoretical models.  This literature reveals a fundamental 
tension in NEPA between its rational comprehensive formulation and incrementalist-
legalist implementation.  While NEPA aims to be comprehensive in scope, it is 
constrained by a project-level focus that has resulted from 1) legalistic implementation 
and 2) gradual erosion of the long-term planning functions of CEQ.  Etzioni’s mixed-
scanning model, incorporating both comprehensive and incremental decision-making, is 
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presented as a framework which, if followed, could provide NEPA with operative 
balance. 
Chapter Four analyzes a series of efforts to develop a national system of 
ecological indicators.  Though such a system has not been achieved at present, these 
reports and initiatives aimed at prompting the federal government into action provide 
evidence of the need for comprehensiveness in environmental information.  These 
proposals also confront the political and institutional challenges associated with 
comprehensive environmental planning and policy. 
Chapter Five proposes a modest informational product which could be adopted by 
CEQ.  This product is comprehensive in scope, synthesizing 1) a national land use and 
ecosystem classification inventory with 2) Ecological Footprint analysis.  This product 
has the potential to operationalize several Title II ambitions.  Though this product is very 
unlikely to impose any formal legal constraints on agency actions, it surely provides 
utility as a framework for deeper understanding of project impacts. 
Chapter Six summarizes the larger analysis and offers concluding thoughts on the 









Chapter 2: Concise Legal History of NEPA 
The Contribution of NEPA to National Environmental Policy 
The passage of the National Environmental Policy Act on January 1, 1970 was a 
watermark in environmental science, politics, and activism.  Its passage triggered a flurry 
of subsequent environmental laws throughout the 1970s in areas such as water, air, and 
species protection.  The buildup to NEPA occurred during the 1960’s as focusing events 
such as the publication of Silent Spring and burning of the Cuyahoga River evolved into a 
mass public movement which pushed the government to action.  Though the rise of the 
environmental movement in the 1960’s and its federal legislative victories in the 1970’s 
have been well-documented, a brief discussion of federal administrative practices in areas 
of resource development and the environment prior to NEPA provides necessary 
perspective on NEPA’s importance and transformative effect. 
An early and relevant treatment of oversized federal authority was Walter Maas’s 
“Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and The Nation’s Rivers”.  Written initially as a 
doctoral dissertation and widely published in 1951, this work provides both a history and 
critical analysis of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers over several decades leading up to 
WWII.  In it, the Corps is presented as a monolithic federal institution of unchecked and 
corruptive power.  Maas describes a political culture characterized by federal pork barrel 
spending and opaque log-rolling by Corps leadership and powerful legislators in key 
committee leadership positions.  Costly water development projects of questionable 
infrastructure importance or economic benefit were awarded to local areas largely on the 
basis of political connections rather than national need.  Maas contrasts this culture of 
insider deal-making with the progressive agenda of the Roosevelt administration seeking 
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expert, rational administration of government for widest public benefit.  Many of the 
strongest condemnations of the Army Engineering Corps come in the foreword from past 
Roosevelt Interior Secretary, Harold Ickes: 
 
One way to describe the Corps of Army Engineers would be to say 
that it is the most powerful and pervasive lobby in Washington.  
The aristocrats who constitute it are our highest ruling class.  They 
are not only the political elite of the army, they are the perfect 
flower of bureaucracy.  At least, this is the reflection that their 
mirrors disclose to them.  Within the field that have elected to 




While environmental concerns as a public policy issue or formal academic pursuit had 
been scarcely articulated at the time of Maas’ writing and were not mentioned in this 
work, his analysis provides a window into the closed nature of federal decision-making at 
the time.  It was this sort of decision model, which valued a short list of economic 
benefits — irrigation, flood control, hydropower — above conservation, recreation, or 
other emerging interests.  In later years, the legacy of many Corps projects would pose 
ongoing resource management challenges for federal bureaucrats not just in the 
engineering area, but also in fish, wildlife, and water quality management.  
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers hegemony over a particular area of resource 
and economic development was not exclusive to the federal bureaucracy.  A broad 
critique of the relationship between government regulators and the industries they 
regulate was offered by University of Chicago economist George Stigler in 1971 article, 
"The Theory of Economic Regulation”.  This article is timely in the context of NEPA in 
that it describes the pattern of government regulation in the decades leading up to 1970.  
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Stigler provides compelling empirical evidence to support his assertion that state 
regulatory agencies initially created to act in the public interest in many instances 
actually come to act on behalf of the economic or special interests that the agency is 
charged with regulating.  The formal economic theory posited by Stigler to describe this 
situation is termed “regulatory capture”.  Regulatory capture occurs when groups or 
individuals with a large stake in a policy or regulatory decision exert intense pressure to 
affect policy outcomes which benefit them.  The rest of the public, who individually have 
much smaller relative stakes in the policy, have no incentive to mobilize and may tend to 
ignore the policy process.  Agencies which have succumbed to such pressures are termed 
“captured agencies”.  Policies formulated and administered by captured agencies often 
produce negative externalities. 
Many pollution problems are classic examples of negative externalities in which 
the true costs of an economic transaction are not born by producer or consumer, but by 
society.  Prior to NEPA and subsequent federal legislation, there was no legal mechanism 
which required even the modest steps of acknowledging or studying these negative 
externalities.  Pollution was viewed as a cost of economic growth that could not be 
managed in the project design or modification stages and must be accepted as an 
unavoidable byproduct of industrial activity.  NEPA required that any project with a 
federal connection investigate its potential negative externalities and explicitly admit a 
causal linkage between projects and environmental impacts. 
Commons problems were also an outcome of regulatory capture.  Extractive 
industries operating on public lands exerted considerable influence on agencies such as 
the Bureau of Land Management and United States Forest Service.  The priorities of 
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agency leadership were often much more closely aligned with the economic values of 
industry than conservation values.  The theory of regulatory capture very closely explains 
why such a situation is commonplace.  As these industries had a very large stake in 
grazing, mining, and timber policies, they exerted much influence on agencies to adopt 
liberal policies.  Agency staffs were often composed of former industry workers or later 
left to work with these firms.  Considering that most of this activity took place on remote 
lands in the Western United States, very few members of the public were even aware of 
those policies and practices which resulted in overuse of public resources.  The nation’s 
constant need for fiber, minerals, fuel, and lumber to fuel growth overshadowed 
conservation as a management goal.  Thus, the pressure exerted by nascent environmental 
groups could not come close to matching that exerted by extractive industries. 
Writing at the same time, political scientist George Wandesforde-Smith echoed 
many of Stigler’s concepts but placed them in an environmental context.  Wandesforde-
Smith attributed much of national resource management policy since the birth of the 
Nation to be the result of laissez-faire economics and a national ethos of individual 
reward for individual initiative (Wandesford-Smith 1970, 205).  These cultural traditions 
led federal oversight on the environment to be limited and value economic uses above all 
others.  What changed this status quo, he argues, was the rise of the progressive ideal 
during the 1930s under Roosevelt and again in the 1960s under Kennedy and, later, 
Johnson.  This ideal saw unfettered free market activity not as a panacea, but rather as a 
potential threat capable of damaging society.  Government not only was capable of 
solving societal problems that the market could not, but it had an ethical responsibility to 
act on behalf of underrepresented interests.  The broader political climate and 
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transformative character of 1960s allowed for an equally transformative shift in national 
thinking on environmental stewardship and conservation.  The government must not 
present itself as neutral arbiter between competing economic and political interests, 
rather, it must take a more active role in defending the Nation’s environment from 
exploitation. 
It is these intersections of political culture, demonstrated agency bias toward 
industry, an evolving environmental policy discourse, and the perception of a national 
problem which both necessitated and allowed the passage of NEPA.  John Muir, Aldo 
Leopold and others had been contributing quite productively to a growing field of 
ecology for several decades, yet NEPA was the first law to ever institutionalize 
ecological considerations.  While later chapters will present a critical examination of 
NEPA’s evolution over forty years, the change it produced in how the federal 
government administers programs, regulates damaging or dangerous activities, and uses 
information must not be casually ignored.  These changes were positive and are an 
example of government openly and honestly confronting the coercive nature of its own 
unchecked power.  In this sense, NEPA is consistent with the Nation’s earliest 
democratic values and the adoption of institutional mechanisms to safeguard these values. 
Four Current NEPA Perpectives 
NEPA’s most notable requirement — the EIS process as outlined in Section 
102(2)(c) of the Act — has over time become the battleground for both proponents and 
opponents of federal actions affecting the environment (Bartlett, R.V. 1999)  As Section 
102(2)(c) sets a legally-enforceable mandate of analysis and review for federal agencies, 
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the actions of federal agencies in satisfying this requirement are frequently challenged in 
the court system.  The possibility of lengthy legal disputes has resulted in many EISs 
becoming complex and voluminous documents, written to withstand possible legal 
challenges.  This has made the EIS process a costly, time-consuming endeavor which 
some developers and agencies view as a thing to be avoided.  Conversely, segments of 
the environmental community view the EIS as a useful obstructionist tool, capable of 
delaying or killing controversial projects. 
 Karkainnen (2004) identifies four general perspectives on NEPA and its 
effectiveness.  He describes the holders of these four perspectives as: “NEPA optimists, 
NEPA monkey wrenchers, NEPA skeptics, and NEPA legalist critics” (Karkainnen 
2004).  The categories are not mutually exclusive, and some NEPA practitioners may 
identify with multiple categories or even all four.  Members of the first category, NEPA 
optimists, contend that NEPA is largely fulfilling its congressional mandate.  NEPA 
optimists believe that the Act’s public participation requirements have been fulfilled and 
have led to greater democracy, transparency, and citizen input on federal actions.  NEPA 
optimists also put great stock in NEPA’s ability to produce rational, informed decision-
making. 
 Conversely, NEPA monkey wrenchers tend to be skeptical of the quality of 
information produced by impact analyses.  Monkey wrenchers assert that the alternatives 
analysis process in NEPA is neither rational nor free from agency bias.  The selection of 
project alternatives for analysis is inherently value-driven and often involves exclusion of 
those alternatives favored by citizens and environmental interest groups.  Despite these 
suspicions, monkey wrenchers view NEPA as an important piece of environmental 
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policy.  Its importance is derived from its use as a legal mechanism that can slow or stop 
unfavorable projects.  The onerous requirements of a full scale EIS may be enough to 
stop a project before it ever leaves the figurative drawing board.  The threat of 
bureaucratic delay wielded by NEPA monkey wrenchers may be enough to get them a 
seat at the table and a position to influence project modification or selection of 
alternatives. 
 NEPA skeptics hold the countervailing position of monkey wrenchers.  Skeptics 
view NEPA as an oversized “paperwork exercise” that accomplishes little, but requires 
much in terms of cost, time, and other resources (Karkainnen 2004, 340).  They resent the 
power that NEPA gives to special interests, i.e., monkey wrenchers, and consider this 
undeserved special interest influence to be anti-democratic.  NEPA skeptics tend to be 
agency personnel overseeing extractive industries that operate on federal land.  Such 
agencies include the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the U.S. Forest Service 
(USFS).  These agencies are often on the receiving end of project delays and 
cancellations, thereby confounding their institutional charge. 
 A fourth perspective, that of NEPA legalist critic, also takes a mostly negative 
view of NEPA, specifically the extent to which its implementation has been mishandled 
by the federal judiciary.  This viewpoint maintains that NEPA exists as a paper tiger that 
has become heavy on process, but light on substance.  A series of unfavorable court 
decisions have incrementally weakened NEPA’s influence and given increasing amounts 
of discretion and authority to agency managers.  This situation is typified by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s record on NEPA cases.  Environmental interest groups have never won 
a single NEPA case before the high court (Karkainnen 2004, 342). 
 12 
 A more in-depth exploration of the NEPA legalist critic’s perspective is essential 
in understanding broader NEPA criticisms.  Out of Karkainnen’s four NEPA 
perspectives, three perspectives can be seen as a direct outcome of NEPA’s procedural 
and documentation requirements.  The NEPA monkey wrencher views these 
requirements as a positive obstructionist tool, while NEPA skeptics and legalist critics 
view them as a negative exercise in paperwork generation.  Upon even a cursory reading, 
one can infer that NEPA surely was not intended solely as means of creating lengthy 
government documents.  As mentioned earlier, NEPA aims to promote a new 
environmental ethic in both process and action (Bartlett, H. 2000; Bartlett, R.V. 1986a, 
1986b, 1999; and Caldwell 1997, 1998).  The struggle to define NEPA as having 
primarily substantive requirements versus primarily procedural requirements will 
characterize NEPA’s interpretation by the courts and implementation by agencies. 
An Initial Substantive Mandate 
 In the years immediately following its passage, NEPA was interpreted as having 
substantive provisions that would require agencies to take specific action based on the 
outcomes of an EIS review.  Both Bartlett (2000) and Pearson (2008) cite the decision in 
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee Inc v. United States Atomic Energy Commission 
(449 F2d 1109, D.C. Circuit, 1971) as an affirmation of NEPA’s substantive mandate.  
Judge Skelly Wright, writing for the majority, concluded: 
 
What possible purpose could there be in the Section 102(2) (C) 
requirement (that the “detailed statement” accompany proposals through 
agency review processes) if “accompany” means no more than physical 
proximity — mandating no more than the physical act of passing certain 
folders and papers, unopened, to reviewing officials along with other 
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folders and papers? What possible purpose could there be in requiring the 
“detailed statement” to be before hearing boards, if the boards are free to 
ignore entirely the contents of the statement? NEPA was meant to do more 
than regulate the flow of papers in the federal bureaucracy. The word 
“accompany” in Section 102(2) (C) must not be read so narrowly as to 
make the Act ludicrous. It must, rather, be read to indicate a congressional 
intent that environmental factors, as compiled in the “detailed statement,” 




The Calvert Cliffs opinion determined that substantive review would not rigidly prescribe 
a specific course of agency action in “particular problematic instances,” but would create 
a “strict standard of compliance” applicable to most projects (449 F2d 1109, D.C. Circuit, 
1971).  A thorough and comprehensive analysis of project impacts and alternatives 
should be conducted.  This analysis should be reflected in the agency’s action to proceed 
with or modify the project to minimize environmental impact.  The process should be 
more than just a “pro forma ritual,” but rather “a full exercise of substantive discretion” 
(449 F2d 1109, D.C. Circuit, 1971).  This legal interpretation is consistent with NEPA’s 
intent.  NEPA aims to “achieve a balance between population and resource use which 
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities” (NEPA, 
101(b)(5)).  NEPA does not intend to prohibit or discourage resource use; rather, its 
intent is to merely structure this use in ways that consider the environment and 
availability of resources for future generations.  Environmental concerns do not 
automatically trump quality-of-life or economic concerns; all concerns must be balanced 
alongside each other.  This standard of substantive review continued to mature through 
decisions of the lower federal courts for several years until 1976 (Bartlett, H. 2000). 
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Shift from Substantive to Procedural Intepretation 
 What little crack Calvert Cliffs opened in giving agencies discretion over what 
constitutes an acceptable level of substantive project review, U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions successively widened to the point of fracture.  Bartlett (2000) identifies the 
erosion of substantive review as having taken place over a progression of four U.S. 
Supreme Court verdicts, beginning in 1976 with Kleppe v. Sierra Club American Electric 
Power System and ending in 1989 with Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council 
(Bartlett, H. 2000).  The ruling in Kleppe, one of the first NEPA cases to reach the U.S. 
Supreme Court, rejected the Sierra Club’s attempt to enjoin the Department of Interior 
(DOI) from leasing large areas of Wyoming’s Powder River Basin to coal mining.  The 
Sierra Club argued that the leasing scheme violated NEPA because no programmatic EIS, 
which would have analyzed the cumulative impacts of numerous scattered mining leases 
on a regional scale was conducted.  In its verdict, the Court gave the DOI wide latitude in 
determining the necessity of such an EIS and ordered that agencies only need take a 
“hard look” at the environmental impacts of a project (427 US 390, U.S. Supreme Court, 
1976).  The implication of the ruling was that a “hard look” may fall well short of a 
comprehensive look. 
 The hard look rule would persist in important NEPA cases that followed, 
including Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
(1978), Stryker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen (1980), and would 
eventually culminate in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council (1989) (Bartlett, H. 
2000, 414).  Robertson effectively shut the door on substantive review and ushered in 
 15 
NEPA’s current conception as a solely procedural act.  In strong language, the decision’s 
opening paragraph reads as follows: 
 
1. NEPA does not impose a substantive duty on agencies to 
mitigate adverse environmental effects or to include in each EIS a 
fully developed mitigation plan. Although the EIS requirement and 
NEPA’s other “action-forcing” procedures implement that statute's 
sweeping policy goals by ensuring that agencies will take a “hard 
look” at environmental consequences and by guaranteeing broad 
public dissemination of relevant information, it is well settled that 
NEPA itself does not impose substantive duties mandating 
particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process for 
preventing uninformed — rather than unwise — agency action. 
(490 US 332, U.S. Supreme Court, 1989) 
 
 
Taken in sum, these four cases represent an about-face from the ruling in Calvert Cliffs 
and, as such, a stark reversal of precedent. 
As a result of these verdicts, legal challenges to the procedural requirements of 
Section 102(2)(c) have become the primary and, some might argue, sole means for 
enforcing the Act (Bartlett, R.V. 1999, 63).  Federal agencies do not have an explicit 
legal requirement to select project alternatives with less environmental impact nor modify 
project proposals to reduce impact.  Thus, NEPA is criticized as having rigorous, even 
exhaustive procedural requirements, but few substantive requirements.  In effect, the 
judicial system has become the primary watchdog for NEPA process and a varied body of 
case law has evolved which has simultaneously clarified and complicated the application 
of NEPA to federal projects.  Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote of NEPA in his dissenting 
opinion in Kleppe v. Sierra Club: 
 
In fact, this vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve as no more 
than a catalyst for development of a “common law” of NEPA. To date, the 
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courts have responded in just that manner and have created such a 
“common law.”  Indeed, that development is the source of NEPA’s 
success. (427 US 390, U.S. Supreme Court, 1976) 
 
 
While the creation of this body of NEPA common law may have been well intended, 
legalist critics argue that leaving the details of NEPA’s application and enforcement to 
the federal judiciary falls short of the Act’s intent.  While NEPA falls squarely in the 
realm of federal administrative law and the courts were surely intended to play a role in 
evaluating agency compliance, NEPA’s policy intent was not just to serve as a procedural 
legal hurdle (Caldwell 1997, 1998). 
Positive Law and NEPA 
What complicates NEPA implementation in our legal system is what confounded 
Justice Marshall: the statute’s “vaguely worded” language.  Murphy (2005) argues that 
courts function most coherently and consistently when asked to evaluate compliance with 
specific rules and rule-making powers.  This belief is represented by the philosophy of 
legal positivism.  Positive law is court-enforced law created by a sovereign power.  
Positive law is clear, specific, and enforceable.  Positive law distinguishes itself from 
natural or moral law, which legal positivists view as too general, open to conflicting 
interpretations, and difficult to enforce.  Murphy gives the example of stealing from one’s 
neighbor.  Moral law forbids coveting her possessions; positive law only forbids actually 
stealing them (Murphy 2005).   
In contrast with other national environmental policies such as the Clean Air Act, 
Clean Water Act, or Endangered Species Act, NEPA is not a regulatory Act.  It does not 
identify objectively measurable physical parameters of importance and then set a 
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threshold value for legal compliance.  As outlined above, NEPA case law has declared 
that the Act’s dominant requirements are procedural: federal agencies must adhere to a 
process, presumably performed in good faith.  NEPA does not require this process to 
produce a specific outcome, but hopes to create an ethic of environmental responsibility.  
Such an ethic can be considered a form of natural law.  This absence of clear, enforceable 
outcomes in natural law, generally, and NEPA, specifically, makes judicial interpretation 
subjective and complex.  Each unique project necessarily requires its own unique process 
of data gathering and analysis.  As such, every project is potentially litigable on the 
grounds that the process used did not adequately satisfy NEPA’s procedural 
requirements.  The response to this threat of litigation is often more process:  more data 
collection, more alternatives analyzed, and the preparation of documents that are greater 
in scope, length, and detail to avoid legal challenge. 
Alternative NEPA Processes and the Future 
In recent years, agencies have responded to this documentation burden by 
circumventing the EIS process in favor of less rigorous process.  NEPA states in section 
102(2)(c) that the EIS process applies to those “major federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment” (NEPA 1969).  Similar to the 
inconsistencies discussed above with regard to procedural vs. substantive review, 
determinations of project significance have also been subject to various judicial 
interpretations.  A major area of inconsistent ruling as it relates to NEPA is on the issue 
of Environmental Assessments (EA) and Findings of No Significant Impact (FONSI).  
The CEQ created EAs to cover a middle-ground of project which cannot yet be classified 
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as significant, but does not qualify for a categorical exclusion.  Before the EIS process is 
triggered, a shorter EA is required which determines environmental significance.  If a 
project is environmentally significant, it must follow the EIS process.  If not significant, a 
“Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI)” is reached.  The original intent of an EA 
was therefore to serve as a scoping mechanism that would reduce documentation 
requirements and administrative burden in appropriate projects.  Complicating this 
process is the fact that the term “significant” has never been rigorously defined in NEPA 
itself or by CEQ regulation (Karkkainen 2002, 919).  NEPA optimists argue that this 
broad definition is one of NEPA’s strengths: the Act does not constrain the range of 
environmentally significant federal actions to a finite list of parameters; it potentially 
covers all actions.  As already established, however, the courts have difficulty 
adjudicating non-positive law and have given agency managers much discretion in 
determinations of significance.  When their judgments conflict with the priorities of 
conservationists, NEPA monkey wrenchers enter these disputes and they proceed to the 
courts. 
The evolving and increasing use of “mitigated FONSIs” adds another layer of 
complexity to agency and judicial determinations of project significance.  A mitigated 
FONSI is possible “when a preliminary version of an EA indicates that environmental 
effects of a proposal are potentially significant, but, with mitigation, can be reduced to 
less than significant levels” (Bass et al. 2001, 57).  Firms and agencies understandably 
want their projects to proceed at least cost in the quickest timeframe possible.  As 
discussed, EIS documentation is a long, costly process with large research, analysis, and 
public involvement requirements.  A mitigated FONSI can be a means of cutting time 
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and cost in those projects with borderline significant impacts.  When used in good faith, 
this third alternative to the two regulatory tracks of EA Æ FONSI or EIS can be positive 
and result in greater government efficiency.  It should be noted that the EIS process does 
not require mitigation nor does it require selection of the alternative with least 
environmental impact.  As stated in the Methow opinion, the EIS process merely prevents 
uninformed agency decisions, not unwise ones.  When used in good faith, the EA Æ 
mitigated FONSI process also encourages agency consideration of and responsibility for 
environmental impacts at an earlier stage of project design (Karkkainen 2004, 348). 
Alternatively, a mitigated FONSI can create the potential for agency abuse and 
violation of NEPA’s intent.  Public involvement is not a requirement of the EA Æ 
mitigated FONSI process.  EAs have no formal public scoping process (Eccleston 2008, 
168) and only 38% of agencies have procedures for public involvement (Solomon et al. 
1997, 266).  This lack of public transparency is contrary to the spirit and essential 
function of NEPA.  While Chapter Three will delve more deeply into political 
interference with NEPA, it must be understood that NEPA’s drafters designed its public 
involvement requirements as an institutional check on government’s ability to undermine, 
evade, or ignore the Act.  Caldwell writes of the importance of this check shortly after 
NEPA’s passage in 1973: 
The drafters of NEPA had no naive illusions as to the readiness of the 
agencies to comply with the intent of the Act.  It was assumed that the 
agencies would be readier to employ 102 procedures to protect their 
missions, programs, and projects from modification on behalf of 
environmental quality.  There could be no certainty as to the willingness 
of the Executive to enforce compliance with the Act.  An alternative to 
Executive enforcement was therefore provided in opening the decision-
processes of the agencies on environmental isssue to public scrutiny by 
reference to the Public Information Act (Caldwell 1973, 167). 
 20 
Thus, a meaningful public involvement component can be considered an essential 
operative component of the Act and its implementation.  The erosion or elimination of 
this component is a significant diminution not just of NEPA’s ambitions, but its everyday 
function.  
Mitigated FONSIs also lack uniform standards for review which can allow agency 
institutional biases to influence the EA process (Davis 2006 and Karkkainen 2002).  In 
the EIS process, the final impact statement is filed with the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).  EPA reviews this document for glaring problems which might be 
damaging to public health, welfare, or environmental quality.  EPA concerns are then 
documented and provided to the CEQ.  The CEQ may or may not choose to take action 
on these concerns.  On this basis, EPA’s role in the EIS process has and continues to be a 
limited one, but it is important to make the distinction that in the EA process, EPA has no 
role when not acting as a lead agency. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Spiller vs. White (2003) involved a 
project for which EPA was acting as a co-lead agency, along with the U.S. Department of 
Tranportation, in a FONSI determination.  This judgment yielded precedent which 
suggests that even when involved as a lead agency, EPA may exercise considerable 
discretion in determining whether to apply NEPA through the EIS or EA process.  The 
case related to the re-use of a 225,000 gallon per day gasoline pipeline across Texas 
which had been offline for several years.  Plaintiffs argued that the project should have 
been subject to a full scale EIS and that the decision of the lead agencies to pursue the 
alternate EA Æ mitigated FONSI process was arbitrary, capricious, and, thus, a violation 
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of NEPA.  The Fifth Circuit did not agree and upheld the verdict of the district court, 
writing: 
 
As we noted earlier, NEPA does not guarantee any substantive results; all 
it ensures is that a particular process will be followed. Herein lies the 
problem for the Collins plaintiffs. They really don’t want more process. 
Indeed, considering the extensive and comprehensive nature of the EA 
conducted here, it is unclear exactly what more process would involve. 
What they really desire is a substantive result: convinced that it poses a 
great threat to the health and safety of its citizens and the environment in 
general, the Collins plaintiffs want this pipeline project killed. 
Unfortunately for their case, and whatever of the merits of that position, 
this outcome cannot be secured in this federal court proceeding. The Lead 
Agencies here have complied with the NEPA statute and its accompanying 
regulations in every way. They have conducted an exhaustive assessment 
of the environmental effects of this proposed pipeline and, after 
consideration concluded that those effects were not significant (352 F. 3d, 
5th Cir. 2003). 
 
 
The final EA document was 2,400 pages in length and included 6,000 written comments 
from 6 public meetings. (Davis 2006, 42)  The developers and lead agencies did complete 
a process which reflected at least the appearance of due diligence.  What is troubling 
about their process, however, is the implication that all of the analysis, public input, and 
documentation were simply produced to support a foregone conclusion, a pro forma 
exercise.  They began from an assertion that the project would have no significant impact, 
then worked backward in a sort of NEPA-esque process to support that result through 
public involvement and extensive documentation.  Accordingly, this verdict can be 
considered as a step backward in providing necessary clarity on the issue of FONSI 
determinations.  These determinations must be made as a result of process and not as its 
starting point.  Any other application of NEPA process fails to comply with its legislative 
charge and denies the spirit of its intent. 
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The federal judiciary has, thus, yielded considerable discretion to agencies on 
both the content and application of NEPA.  In the first two decades of its existence, the 
U.S. Supreme Court effectively reduced NEPA to a single procedural requirement in a 
single line — section 102(2)(c) — out of a 3,000 word bill.  The reduction of NEPA to 
procedural compliance with 102(2)(c) can be understood in the context of positive law.  
Courts perceived this section as the only aspect of the bill which could be enforced.  In 
order to satisfy a court’s “hard look” test, agencies must only prove that they followed a 
process.  Both the level of rigor involved in the EIS process and the extent to which it 
influences outcomes are left to the agency discretion.  A determination of adequate 
process tends to be viewed through a limited, project-specific lens.  Thus, the “hard look” 
test for section 102(2)(c) is opaque.  It needs a level of consistency, transparency, and 
visibility that applies to all agencies. 
In recent years, courts have even undermined the EIS procedural requirement.  
The Spiller verdict established precedent that gave agencies discretion over definitions of 
significance and suggested the EIS process can be optional.  This development does not 
bode well for NEPA’s future and continues the trend of NEPA being a statute that is 




Chapter 3: NEPA Administrative History and Theory 
 
While it is appropriate to begin an examination of NEPA with its legal history and 
the federal judiciary’s shift from a substantive to procedural interpretation of NEPA, this 
tension between process and outcome is not limited to a single branch of government.  It 
must also be understood that just as the courts have struggled to interpret and implement 
NEPA, so has the bureaucracy.  Three classic and competing streams in planning and 
policy theory offer useful frameworks for study of NEPA implementation by the 
Executive branch.  As drafted, NEPA can be viewed as an example of the rational 
comprehensive model described by Simon (1946).  As applied, NEPA is an example of 
the incremental model described by Lindblom (1959).  This divergence between 
conception and application results in scattered implementation of NEPA, inconsistent 
with its policy intent and variable in terms of success. 
Planning and Policy Theoretical Models 
Rational Comprehensive Model 
The rational comprehensive model has been a centerpiece in planning theory and 
practice since its early description by Herbert Simon in his classic 1946 article, “The 
Proverbs of Administration.”  Rationalism is characterized by its reliance on science, 
claims to objectivity, and emphasis on determining single, optimal solutions which 
represent greatest net social benefit or “greatest good for all” (Smith and Larimer 2009).  
NEPA rests squarely in this tradition with its emphasis on interdisciplinary science, 
analysis of alternatives, and comprehensive scope.   Although often criticized for its 
flaws and attributed as the cause of many failed plans and policies, rationalism persists, if 
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only as an ideal to be pursued.  Even in his early writings, Simon anticipates this criticism 
by arguing that rationalism has obvious and consequential limits.  Bounded rationalism 
acknowledges that perfect rationalism is never achievable; it is constrained by skills, 
values, and knowledge/information (Simon 1946, 64-65).  While his early writings relate 
primarily to the limits of the individual, Simon’s later writings identify specific forms of 
rationalism and put individual limits in the context of institutions, processes, and politics. 
Simon’s 1985 article, “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology 
with Political Science”, parallels NEPA’s tug-of-war between substantive and procedural 
law.  Simon identifies substantive and procedural rationality as two distinct forms of 
rationality.  He acknowledges that his terms are borrowed from constitutional law and 
consistent with legal definitions of substantive and procedural due process. Thus, 
rationality may be achieved through either a rational decision (substantive) or a 
reasonable process of decision-making (procedural).  The defining character of 
substantive rationality is its objectivity: the arrival by a judge or administrator at an 
objectively optimal choice.  In this respect, substantive rationality is decidedly unbound: 
a decision is either optimal or it isn’t and true optimality can only be achieved through 
the inclusion of all variables and considerations.  Conversely, the defining feature of 
procedural rationality is its subjectivity.  Subjectivity and context erect firm bounds to 
perfect rationalism and influence the actions of public administrators.  Simon writes: 
 
To deduce the procedurally or boundedly rational choice in a situation, we 
must know the choosing organism's goals, the information and 
conceptualization it has of the situation, and its abilities to draw inferences 
from the information it possesses. We need know nothing about the 
objective situation in which the organism finds itself, except insofar as that 
situation influences the subjective representation. (Simon 1985, 294) 
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In this regard, Simon has put the administrator in the context of an imperfect, political, 
and information-limited institution.  An administrator utilizing procedural rationality is 
influenced by three things: values, information held, and usability or relevance of that 
information.  This description presents a more realistic picture of administrative decision-
making and the federal bureaucracy.  In this portrayal, information is currency.  How 
information is used and sought is not perfectly rational nor objective; information is used, 
misused, or disused in furtherance of individual and institutional agendas.  As has been 
discussed, the weight of NEPA’s implementation tends to vary by agency and/or 
Presidential administration.  The justification for a particular approach to NEPA is often 
based on inclusion, selective omission, or emphasis of key information.  Using the 
pipeline project adjudicated in Spiller v. White as an example, agency managers 
successfully shifted the informational focus of analysis away from significance of 
impacts toward adequacy of mitigation.  This is a strategy repeated in other recent NEPA 
cases which subtly changes the informational needs of a project analysis from 
environmental damage to environmental restoration.  Environmental restoration as a 
starting point implicitly accepts that environmental damage will occur and, as such, 
symbolizes an early concession to environmental damage, contrary to NEPA principles. 
While Simon has offered a general description of administrative decision-making, 
it is a description that can be almost perfectly superimposed on NEPA as ideal and NEPA 
as real.  Substantive rationality may describe the NEPA that its drafters hoped to produce, 
however, procedural rationality describes that NEPA that has evolved.  More broadly, 
Simon’s article highlights the futility of those who would scrap the rational model 
entirely.  In response to criticisms of the rational model, a more useful exercise for both 
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academicians and administrators is to recognize its limits.  A more qualified 
understanding of administrative rationality is needed when studying policies such as 
NEPA which have roots in the rationalist tradition.  Simon’s procedural rationality, as 
distinct from substantive rationality, puts NEPA in a more detailed and current context.  
Procedural rationality also introduces the notion of values or normative bias and the 
importance of information in administrative decision-making.  The role of information in 
NEPA processes is a primary focus in this analysis.   Though some of its criticisms may 
be valid, rationalism maintains its importance in this analysis and other serious 
discussions of planning and policy theory.  And, as will be developed throughout this 
chapter, bounded rationalism is an apt and useful conceptual model for understanding 
NEPA. 
Incremental Model 
The response of planning and policy theoreticians to the rational model was the 
incremental model.  While rationalism is comprehensive in scope and at least in its early 
forms claimed a sort of neutral, objective detachment, incrementalism is measured in 
effect and referential in analysis.  The counterweight to Simon’s classic 1946 article on 
bounded rationality is Charles Lindblom’s 1959, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through.”  
In it, Lindblom decries elite, expert decision-making as anti-democratic and argues for a 
slower, more participatory, cautious approach to policy change.  He argues radical 
change in a democracy is neither preferable nor predictable in its effects.  Past policy 
sequences must be referred to and built upon in subsequent policy steps because past 
policies contain the lessons of success and failure.  To ignore this body of knowledge is 
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reckless and leads to poor policy solutions.  In Lindblom’s ideal policy environment, a 
broad array of citizen and interest groups slug it out until one policy proposal emerges 
victorious or incorporates elements of other proposals to reach a deliberated compromise. 
NEPA’s legal history certainly follows in the tradition of a competitive, 
adversarial policy environment that Lindblom describes.  Lindblom elevates the role of 
the “watchdog” in society, writing: “And these watchdogs can protect the interests in 
their jurisdiction in two quite different ways: first, by redressing damages done by other 
agencies; and, second, by anticipating and heading off injury before it occurs” (Lindblom 
1959, 85).  Lindblom’s “watchdogs” are, thus, analogous to Karkainnen’s “monkey-
wrenchers.”  Watchdogs should not be construed strictly as those representing 
environmental interests, but also as those representing the economic and corporate 
interests which oppose them.  One side serves as guardians for the environment while the 
other serves as guardians for commerce and economic growth.  In Lindblom’s democratic 
forum, these various interests must conflict with and check each other to arrive at plans 
and policies which — he argues — therefore represent the best interests of society. 
The legal scholarship and case studies presented above show NEPA as a fertile 
battleground for ongoing legal wrangling.  Recent cases suggest a trend toward gradual 
erosion of NEPA’s congressional mandate both in Section 102(2)(c) and the broader 
statute.  The essence of this progression is its incremental character.  The creation of a 
body of NEPA “common law” as envisioned by Justice Marshall in Kleppe has certainly 
been actualized.  The creation of a body of common law can be seen as the most 
incremental of all government policy processes.  Common or case law is perfectly 
consistent with Lindblom’s definition of incrementalism as a process of “successive, 
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limited comparisons” (Lindblom 1959).  The defining feature of common law is the 
importance of legal precedent and its influence in binding future legal decisions.  No 
decision can be made without a thorough analysis of all relevant prior decisions.  
Verdicts must be consistent with prior decisions and drastic, unexpected changes in court 
decisions are rare by design.  NEPA’s emphasis on procedural compliance with Section 
102(2)(c) – a single line out a 3,000 word bill – did not happen immediately upon 
passage of the act; it slowly developed out of legal conflict, evolving precedent, and 
specific language in NEPA that courts could make operative.  Much of the statute’s 
language could not be made operative by the courts.  
Mixed-Scanning Model   
Limitations of both the rational and incremental models eventually produced a 
third planning theory stream that finds a middle path.  This third theory is presented in 
Amitai Etzioni’s 1967 article, “Mixed Scanning: A ‘Third’ Approach to Decision-
Making.”  In it, Etzioni is critical of rationalism’s false claims of value-neutrality and 
comprehensiveness, echoing incrementalist concerns.  He argues that comprehensiveness 
is not possible due to both the bounded cognitive capacities of administrators, as well as 
the finite resources of administrative institutions.  In developing or implementing a policy 
solution, decision-makers must allocate finite resources based on their own understanding 
of a problem.  This process of problem definition includes some problem variables while 
necessarily excluding others.  Administrative manageability is not possible without 
decisions of scope and priority.  Furthermore, this process of inclusion or exclusion also 
must relate to individual and/or institutional values.  Certain considerations are deemed 
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worthy of attention and treatment while others are not.  This selection is itself a 
normative process. 
Etzioni offers two central criticisms of incrementalism.  First, incrementalism 
resists innovation, threatening to trap policy makers and administrators in a business-as-
usual mindset.  Intractable problems which require a novel approach are shortchanged 
because acceptable solutions must be derivative of past solutions, which, in the case of a 
persistent problem, have all failed.   Etzioni’s second criticism is that incrementalism 
contains a rudderless, “drifting” quality of “action without direction” (Etizioni 1967, 
388).  Numerous, small, remedial policy actions should not simply be evaluated as 
separate units in the context of recent patterns; these actions must also be evaluated in 
aggregate as forming a trend and a single unit of analysis.  A tradition of seemingly 
measured, benign decisions may, as a body, produce effects that were unexpected or 
unintended when the scale of analysis is broadened.  The interconnected nature of some 
problems certainly describes many modern environmental problems.  Global warming, 
overharvest of marine fisheries, and hypoxia in the northern Gulf of Mexico are all 
examples from a much larger list of broad-scale ecological problems that require 
systemic, integrated analysis of numerous, fragmented policies and policy steps.  NEPA 
aims for this comprehensive scope of analysis, referring to “the interrelations of all 
components of the natural environment” in its very first sentence (NEPA 1969). 
Etzioni’s answer to the shortcomings of both rationalism and incrementalism was 
to propose a classic “middle way” solution, whereby useful elements of both models 
would be fused to create a new one.  This approach – “mixed scanning” – has mutually-
informing and reinforcing micro- and macro-orientations.  The central characteristic of 
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mixed scanning is the relationship between its two components of “(a) high-order, 
fundamental policy making processes which set basic directions and (b) incremental ones 
which prepare for fundamental decisions and work them out after they have been 
reached” (Etzioni 1967, 385).  Etzioni lists various benefits of the mixed-scanning 
approach.  First, it “provides a particular procedure for the collection of information.”  
Second, it “provides a strategy for evaluation” of past, present, and proposed actions.  
And third, 
…each of the two elements in mixed scanning helps to reduce the effects 
of the particular shortcomings of the other; incrementalism reduces the 
unrealistic aspects of rationalism by limiting the details required in 
fundamental decisions, and contextuating rationalism helps to overcome 
the conservative slant of incrementalism by exploring longer-run 
alternatives (Etzioni 1967, 390). 
 
 
Etzioni’s description of the strengths of mixed scanning can be distilled to two main 
points: 1) systematized, prioritized information collection and evaluation 2) a balance 
between short-term, politically-influenced policy priorities and long-term, rational 
concerns.  In these respects, mixed-scanning bears considerable resemblance to Simon’s 
procedural rationality.  Both theoretical models stress the importance of information to 
the planner or administrator, as well as varying and competing normative pressures which 
she is under. 
Just as Simon’s procedural and substantive rationality shed much light on NEPA 
as ideal versus NEPA as real, Etzioni’s theoretical framework can also be applied quite 
directly to gain insight on NEPA.  The NEPA statute contains two distinct sections – 
Title I and Title II – that classify its mandate by size and scope.  Title I largely describes 
those requirements federal agencies must follow in considering the impacts of specific 
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projects or policies.  Title II creates a coordinating institution in the EOP, the CEQ, 
which is charged with both oversight of Title I compliance by agencies, as well as a 
broad mandate to monitor “the status and condition of the major natural, manmade, or 
altered environmental classes of the Nation” (NEPA 1969).  In both respects, NEPA can 
be considered an example of a mixed-scanning approach to planning and policy.  Title I 
relates to specific, incremental agency actions while Title II relates to the understanding 
and protection of the Nation’s environment as a whole, integrated system.  Thus, the 
creation of CEQ signifies – using Etzioni’s terminology – a fundamental policy decision.  
This decision declares ecological health a national priority and CEQ as its safeguard. 
CEQ History 
 The extent to which CEQ has fulfilled its legislative charge is questionable.  The 
writings of Dr. Lynton Caldwell, NEPA’s drafter, offer a well qualified assessment of 
CEQ in the decades following its creation.  In various essays, Caldwell asserts that the 
courts do not deserve full blame for NEPA’s largely legalistic interpretation; this blame 
must be shared with the Presidency and its lack of support for CEQ (Caldwell 1997, 
1998).  Caldwell argues that CEQ’s institutional strength has varied over time as a 
function of multiple factors including funding, staffing, jurisdictional tension with EPA, 
and general understanding of CEQ and its role in federal environmental policy (Caldwell 
1997, 1998 and Gibbons 2008).  During the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations, 
CEQ was well-staffed, well-funded, and grew into a productive role in providing agency 
guidance on the EIS process, as well as issuing strong annual environmental quality 
reports.  The Carter Administration’s, “Year 2000 Report,” produced in 1980, was a 
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pioneering document that forecasted current environmental trends twenty years into the 
future. 
 The Reagan administration hollowed out CEQ to the point of irrelevancy through 
de-funding and de-staffing from 49 employees to 8.  These eight years of Presidential 
hostility to CEQ created a legacy of institutional weakness that CEQ still struggles to 
overcome.  The subsequent administration of George H.W. Bush revived CEQ 
somewhat, particularly in the area of wetland conservation.  He raised staffing levels 
from 8 to 31.  The Clinton administration was largely hostile to CEQ and early in the first 
Presidential term attempted to abolish it.  This effort was led by Vice President Al Gore 
and aimed to make EPA Director a cabinet level position.  The proposed legislation – 
H.R. 3512 – ultimately failed, but revealed the Clinton administration’s lack of 
understanding or regard for CEQ’s institutional role and the role of NEPA generally.  
They cut CEQ staff from 31 to 25.  The administration of George W. Bush was clearly 
distracted by foreign policy issues and military expansionism which left CEQ largely 
unwatched and unmanaged.  CEQ staff were involved in the Bush administration 
campaign to control government communication on climate science.  The Obama 
administration seems to have continued the trend of poor understanding of CEQ in the 
appointment of “Climate Czar” Carol Browner.  Institutionally speaking, it is logical to 
delegate these responsibilities to the CEQ chairperson or, at a minimum, locate this new 
position within CEQ.  By creating this position separate from CEQ, climate and national 
ecological health are administratively decoupled.  This disconnect is not helpful for 
producing good science or policy. 
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The later writings of Lynton Caldwell express his frustration with the degree to 
which CEQ has been subjected to the political whims of the Executive (Caldwell 1997, 
1998).  It was clearly not the intention of NEPA’s drafters to design CEQ in a manner 
that would allow this level of political interference in CEQ’s charge.  Specifically, 
Caldwell is most frustrated by the blurring of responsibilities between White House staff 
and the Executive Office of the President (EOP).  Caldwell asserts that the EOP in its 
practiced form does not have a suitable level of political detachment as was its intent. 
Caldwell frequently cites the Brownlow Committee of 1939, which established the 
responsibilities of White House staff and the EOP as necessarily distinct.  The Brownlow 
Committee intended for the EOP to be non-political, but rather managerial with policy 
and decision-making responsibilities.  EOP leadership would be subject to Senate 
confirmation on the basis of their area expertise.  Conversely, White House staff would 
serve as personal, political assistants to the President, have no policy-making authority, 
have limited issue-specific expertise, and would not be subject to senate confirmation.   
Caldwell (1997) also discusses how the Presidency since 1960 and the election of 
John F. Kennedy has shifted from what he terms “The Institutional Presidency” to “The 
Personal Presidency” (Caldwell 1997, 45).  He writes, “The personal presidency 
emphasizes political leadership and decision making by the man; the institutional 
presidency subordinates the man to the office and to the functions and duties specified 
under Article II of the Constitution” (Caldwell 1997, 45).  He asks the valid question, 
“Does the power of a president reside primarily in the person or the office?” (Caldwell 
1997, 45).   This shift is clearly evident as related to CEQ.  In the first decade of its 
existence, CEQ was respected on the basis of its congressional mandate and viewed as a 
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necessary institution responsible for the integration of a comprehensive national 
environmental policy.  In later decades, it was subjugated, or altogether ignored, as a 
function of the Executive’s political ideology and resulting policy priorities.  CEQ has 
certainly not been immune to the pressures and developments in our larger political 
culture as substantive policy discussion has become increasingly overshadowed by 
political symbolism, discourse, and rhetoric (Fischer 2003). 
Despite CEQ’s history of Presidential interference, its most damaging attack came 
from Congress.  Fundamental to Title II of NEPA is its environmental monitoring, 
reporting, and trend forecasting responsibilities.  The opening to Title II’s first paragraph 
declares these as over-arching priorities: 
 
The President shall transmit to the Congress annually beginning July 1, 
1970, an Environmental Quality Report (hereinafter referred to as the 
“report”) which shall set forth (1) the status and condition of the major 
natural, manmade, or altered environmental classes of the Nation, 
including, but not limited to, the air, the aquatic, including marine, 
estuarine, and fresh water, and the terrestrial environment, including, but 
not limited to, the forest, dryland, wetland, range, urban, suburban an rural 
environment; (2) current and foreseeable trends in the quality, 
management and utilization of such environments and the effects of those 




Considered in the context of Etzioni’s mixed-scanning model, this annual environmental 
quality report can be considered a fundamental policy decision.  It is the central 
framework for the collection and interpretation of environmental information.  As a 
continuous, long-term reporting requirement, it establishes ecological baseline data that 
can be used to evaluate improvement or decline in various areas of the environment.  The 
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record can also be used for prospective analysis to identify trends.  It provides NEPA’s 
comprehensive, macro-orientation that makes NEPA a truly national policy. 
 In addition to the explicit features of Title II’s annual reporting requirement, there 
also exists a critical implicit feature.  This implicit feature is the report’s function as a 
political buffer.  This buffer – in the tradition of mixed scanning – incorporates the 
strengths of both rationalism and incrementalism.  The report’s reliance on scientific 
measurement and description gives both the document, specifically, and Title  II, 
generally, its rationalist orientation and the benefits that accompany it.  These benefits are 
a measure of political detachment and an expectation of scientific objectivity.  A 
foundation in science gives the report authority and resists political distortion. 
CEQ’s annual report also offers the benefits of an incremental policy approach.  
The fact that the report is an annual ritual binds it somewhat to the expectations of past 
reports.  This incremental character serves as a barrier to those Presidential 
administrations who would wish to weaken the report.  A marked departure from the 
rigor and scope of analysis in past reports would likely generate negative attention from 
the media, interest groups, the public, and elected officials friendly to environmental 
concerns.  In these respects, CEQ’s annual reporting requirement incorporates the best 
elements of both policy models: the standard of bureaucratic convention as well as the 
evolving, assimilative capacity of science to expand and incorporate new knowledge.  A 
truly balanced implementation of NEPA includes equal emphasis on both Title I and Title 
II of the statute.  Such an implementation follows Etzioni’s mixed-scanning model, 
incorporating micro-level project requirements, such as the court’s established “hard 
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look” test regarding the EIS requirement, and macro-level monitoring for the nation, such 
as CEQ’s annual environmental report. 
Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995   
 The capacity of CEQ’s annual reporting requirement in giving direction to the 
broader NEPA statute suggests why opponents of environmental protection saw it as a 
nuisance — even a threat — and wished to eliminate it.  If the nation is not monitoring its 
environmental decay on a comprehensive scale, then those individual project-level 
actions that are damaging cannot be connected to larger trends and, thus, seem isolated in 
effect.  Opponents of national environmental accounting found their champion in the 
104th or “Gingrich Congress” of 1995.  The 104th Congress, emboldened by Republican 
gains in the 1994 mid-term elections, sought to implement their “Contract with America.”  
This document was aimed at reducing the size and scope of the federal government under 
the banner of fiscal responsibility.  The plan was heavily grounded in conservative 
ideology and sought to further conservative priorities in areas such as national defense 
while “eliminating unjustifiable federal programs, such as subsidies to the arts and 
humanities as well as public television and radio” through budget cuts (Heritage 
Foundation, 1995).  The broader Contract with America involved numerous legislative 
initiatives, one of which was the Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act (FRESA) of 
1995.   
 Though the Contract with America claimed the objective of government 
transparency and accountability, the details of FRESA were decidedly murky.  FRESA 
did not call for the immediate elimination of the targeted reports; rather, it set a sunset 
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date of December 21, 1999 at which all the reporting requirements listed in the bill would 
expire.  The delay had the effect of masking the bill’s severity, with the assumption that 
committees would have four years to save their pet reports.  The four-year sunset clause 
also took advantage of the government’s tendency to procrastinate.  Further complicating 
FRESA interpretation was that no precise list of those reports set to expire was made 
available until the summer of 1999 by the Clerk of the House (House Report 106-458).  
This list was contained in an uncirculated committee report, House Document 103-7, 
from the previous Congress.  The list itself was the source of confusion, errors, and 
inconsistencies.  An effort to reinstate many of the affected environmental reports was 
presented in the proposed Resources Reports Restoration Act of the 106th Congress.  The 
proposed Act described the problems with House Document 103-7 as follows: 
 
First, the publication covered more than mere reports to Congress—it also 
addressed other submissions such as draft legislation, copies of 
environmental impact statements, budget documents, and copies of 
intergovernmental agreements. Few realized the wide-ranging impact of 
the termination of otherwise innocently termed ‘‘reports.’’ Second, the 
publication failed to list every report to Congress, creating confusion over 
which reports were affected. Third, it contained errors in report titles and 
statutory sources, creating great hurdles in identifying the underlying 
reports. Finally, it listed reporting requirements which had already been 
satisfied by the submission of the required materials to Congress and listed 
reporting requirements which had been repealed (House Report 106-458). 
 
 
These features suggest that FRESA can be seen not as the good-faith effort to reduce the 
federal government’s paperwork burden that it claimed to be, but rather a careless attempt 
to shrink government through a slash-and-burn approach to weakening its administrative 
capacity.  The assessment above shows that there was little or no process of selection for 
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determining which reports had value and which didn’t.  The source for these 
determinations apparently had not even been fact-checked. 
While conservative ideologues often claim incrementalism as their preferred 
model of policy change, FRESA signified a clear departure from an incremental 
approach.  It was comprehensive in scope, but involved no component of rational 
analysis in deciding where the axe fell.  FRESA was a political result of conservative 
movement goals: shrink government through any means possible irrespective of effect 
and public input.  FRESA ultimately eliminated 150 federal reports submitted to 
Congress and available to the public (House Report 106-458).  Such reports provide a 
record of government activity and opportunities for public involvement in determining 
their content.  They reveal agency priorities and how policies are implemented by the 
bureaucracy.  FRESA can, thus, be considered as ideologically antithetical to NEPA.  
While NEPA mandates an open process of analysis with numerous stages of public and 
stakeholder involvement, FRESA severely restricts the public’s access to government 
information and activity without explanation. 
Bounds to NEPA Rational Comprehensive Policy Intent 
 The discussion in both Chapters Two and Three presents NEPA after 40 years of 
implementation.  Chapter Two reviewed major aspects of the Act’s legal history.  The 
defining feature of NEPA’s legal history is its incremental, procedural interpretation.  
The NEPA process requires agencies to take a “hard look” at project impacts, but what 
constitutes a hard look varies by project and has been inconsistently adjudicated.  The 
courts have struggled to adjudicate NEPA due to its general language and absence of 
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enforceable, positive law.  Trends in federal rulings, such as Spiller v. White, may 
portend erosion of the EIS requirement in favor of less rigorous process. 
This chapter reviewed administrative developments related to NEPA and CEQ in 
the context of planning and policy theory.  Administratively, NEPA guidance and agency 
implementation has suffered since 1981 due to political interference.  CEQ — the 
institution intended to implement NEPA — has been poorly funded and poorly 
understood (Caldwell 1997, 1998).   Absent strong political leadership on NEPA 
principles, some agencies have not exhibited more than the legally-defensible, minimum 
commitment to NEPA principles.  Some agencies lack a consistent framework for 
evaluating project impacts, a framework that could yield time and cost efficiencies.  
CEQ’s national annual environmental quality reports were eliminated by the Gingrich 
Congress in 1995. 
Etzioni’s mixed-scanning model suggests that without CEQ’s annual reports, 
NEPA is imbalanced toward incremental policy implementation with no long-term 
direction or regard for fundamental decisions.  An incrementalist, case-by-case, project-
by-project orientation does not achieve NEPA’s goal for science-based, rational 
comprehensive environmental decision-making.  NEPA’s language clearly intends a 
comprehensive, holistic, and integrated approach to ecosystem management which must 
incorporate broad scales in a unifying, over-arching framework that encompasses the 
entire earth system. 
This tension between NEPA’s rational, technocratic formulation and its largely 
legalistic implementation defines its policy character.  While the techno-rational model 
aims for the greatest good for the greatest number as a normative goal, the legal model 
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encourages participation that is driven from a singular or narrow set of interests 
(Stephenson 2000).  This contrast certainly applies to NEPA and has challenged its 
implementation over forty years.  NEPA’s rational comprehensive policy origins were 
surely well-intended; however, its largely legalistic implementation has complicated the 
achievement of a rational orientation. 
NEPA’s rationalist aspirations exist within established, well-defined bounds.  
Legally, NEPA is bound by the vagaries of the “hard look” test.   Administratively, 
NEPA is bound by 1) political interference with CEQ and 2) information.  Simon’s 
procedural rationality helps us delineate these two administrative bounds.  Etzioni’s 
model of mixed scanning further highlights a specific informational need: the need for 
broad-scale, fundamental environmental information usable for long-term planning.  This 
component of NEPA information was eliminated by the Federal Reports Elimination and 
Sunset Act of 1995. 
The hard look test is established legal precedent and can be considered a fixed 
variable.  CEQ’s 40 year history of political subversion, weakening, and 
misunderstanding suggest that political interference with NEPA’s mandate is also a fixed 
variable.  It may also be reasonable to expect that these negative political pressures may 
not just remain constant, but increase.  The era of transformative environmental 
legislation has passed.  The expanding legal requirements of the EIS process have made 
full-scale impact analysis costly and time-consuming.  Growing entitlement spending, 
partisan gridlock, and the cost of maintaining extensive overseas military commitments 
suggest that federal spending on the environment will be less in the future.  Thus, 
information is the most fluid variable of the three. 
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 Given these real and consequential bounds to the achievement of NEPA’s 
rationalist legislative intent, it is appropriate to ask, “how can NEPA, generally, and 
CEQ, specifically, be strengthened given the constraints which forty years of incremental 
implementation have produced?”  This answer is information.  NEPA has and always 
should have a reliance on quality, interdisciplinary science-based information as its main 
policy strength.  This information must also be accessible.  No, NEPA does not prescribe 
a specific outcome, but it does inform.  This variable of information is not fixed and it 
certainly can be strengthened.  Such strengthening may produce a new, long-term 
national commitment to NEPA principles.  The means for this transformation is the 
renewal of a comprehensive focus within CEQ.  NEPA’s conceptual and practical 
foundation – information – might eventually be used not only to uphold NEPA principles 
against legal erosion and political interference, but also to improve both legal and 
administrative decision-making. 
The next chapter evaluates a broader effort to promote comprehensiveness in 
environmental information: the effort to develop national environmental indicators.  This 
effort overlaps with NEPA’s comprehensive mandate, but has also moved forward on its 
own for over a decade.  Analysis of efforts to develop comprehensive national indicators 
informs both an understanding of what is reasonably achievable considering NEPA’s 
constraints as well as potential areas of unmet need or niches which CEQ might fill. 
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Chapter 4: National Ecological Indicators and the Call 
for Comprehensiveness 
 
The discussion above presents NEPA in the context of legal, administrative, and 
informational bounds relative to its rational comprehensive intent.  These bounds prevent 
the achievement of a truly national environmental policy.  Relating these bounds to both 
Simon’s concept of procedural rationality and Etzioni’s mixed-scanning model suggests 
that NEPA must maintain its macro-level orientation as outlined in Title II of the statute.  
This fundamental, broad-scale, and long-term focus has been undermined by political 
interference with CEQ’s mandate, including the elimination of its annual reporting 
requirement in 1995. 
While the vulnerability of NEPA’s macro-orientation has been proven, its 
importance persists.  A clear balance between micro-level policy steps, as typified by 
project-level impact analysis, and macro-level policy guidance, as typified by a national 
environmental reporting requirement, is key to NEPA’s strength and relevance.  Both can 
be considered NEPA’s operative elements.  The structure of the Act is suggestive of this 
balance between micro- and macro-oversight with its division into Title I and Title II 
sections.  While neither Caldwell nor other NEPA drafters have commented on any 
explicit linkages between mixed-scanning and NEPA’s policy formulation, clear parallels 
exist.  These parallels weigh short-term, sometimes politically-influenced project 
proposals against fundamental priorities of national importance.   
The capacity of a mixed-scanning approach to provide balance between the 
political and the rational is its strength.  It simultaneously accommodates and moderates 
both influences.  Etzioni describes mixed scanning as “a useful strategy for decision-
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making in environments of varying stability and by actors with varying control and 
consensus-building capacities” (Etzioni 1967, 385).  Chapters Two and Three established 
that national environmental policy is itself an area of “varying stability,” subject to 
intrusion, interference, and misinterpretation by all three branches of government.  Even 
during the drafting of NEPA, Caldwell reports that he and his fellow authors had “no 
naïve illusions as to the readiness of the agencies to comply with the intent of the Act” or 
“willingness of the Executive to enforce compliance with the Act” (Caldwell 1973, 167).  
Their precaution against government antipathy was significant public involvement and 
reporting requirements.  As discussed, some of these requirements have been eroded as 
the NEPA process has shifted from EIS to EA review.  This decrease in public 
participation leaves NEPA out of balance between the political and rational. 
The integration of mixed-scanning theory and the historical analysis presented 
above makes clear that NEPA’s comprehensive, macro-level information focus must be 
renewed if the Act is to maintain continued relevance in the future. While the first half of 
this thesis focused on NEPA’s constraints and offered mostly critique, the second half of 
this thesis explores opportunities to strengthen and integrate NEPA in the context of its 
macro-level information mandate.  A format for resumption of NEPA’s macro-level 
functions will be proposed in the form of a comprehensive information product that 
integrates two components: 1) a national land use and ecosystem inventory with 2) 
ecological foot-printing.  The following section demonstrates the need for 
comprehensive, macro-level ecological information. 
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 Almost immediately upon elimination of CEQ’s annual reporting requirement in 
1995, a din began rising within bureaucratic, environmental science, and policy circles. 
This din was in the form of an organized, growing call for a national system of ecological 
indicators.  Though such a system had also been discussed in the 1970s and 80s, a review 
of these efforts reveals the most progress toward this goal took place during the late 
1990s and early 2000s.  Although the elimination of CEQ’s report was certainly a defeat 
for environmental advocates, it initiated this clarion call for formalized comprehensive 
environmental information and reporting.  Appendix B provides a chronology of the 
seminal reports in this effort. 
The reports themselves have a progressive character, each referencing content 
from previous reports.  In other instances, different reports commissioned by different 
federal bureaucracies produce almost entirely the same results.  A brief summary of the 
key themes developed in this series of reports is, thus, necessary and instructive in 
understanding both the need for and essential features of an integrated national ecological 
information system. 
Scientific and Technical Focus (1997-2003) 
National Science and Technology Council 
 The first report in this body, “Integrating the Nation’s Environmental Monitoring 
and Research Programs: A Proposed Framework,” was commissioned by the White 
House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in 1995 and undertaken by the 
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).  The NSTC is a cabinet-level council 
charged with coordinating federal research and development activities.  The report, 
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released in March, 1997, initiated discussion of both objectives and methods for 
integrating environmental data.  The NSTC report outlined three objectives to be 
pursued: 
 
1. Status of ecosystems. Document coincident status and trends of 
multiple resources and related environmental and socioeconomic 
conditions. 
2. Causes and consequences of change. Using the best scientific 
information available: 
- Relate status and trends to human and natural causes and consequences, 
- Predict future trajectories and rates of change, 
- Assess uncertainties, and 
- Identify data, information, and research needed to reduce future 
uncertainties. 
3. Options and outcomes. Evaluate science-based approaches for 
ensuring sustained productivity, vitality, use, and enjoyment of ecological 
systems (NSTC 1997, viii). 
 
 
These three objectives are clearly consistent with NEPA principles.  Objectives 
one and two relate very closely to language in Title II which mandates monitoring of the 
national environment’s “status and condition” along with its “current and foreseeable 
trends” (NEPA 1969).  Objective three closely follows NEPA’s overall regard for 
“productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment” (NEPA 1969).   
Although NSTC’s objectives were proposed in a general context outside of NEPA or 
other specific environmental legislation, the objectives are proof that in some sense 
NEPA principles have been adopted – at least as an ideal to be pursued – by the federal 
bureaucracy.  The objectives acknowledge that humans are intertwined with both 
environmental and economic systems.  The objectives promote a science-based 
understanding of the environment that explores causal relationships and can increase 
predictive capacity. 
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 The NSTC framework proposed the integration of environmental data along three 
scales.  The first scale, “Inventories and Remote Sensing Programs,” would apply to large 
regions and would be collected using remote sensing technology.  This technology uses 
satellite and aerial imagery to record and characterize land classes and uses.  These 
technologies did not exist for environmental science applications at the time of NEPA’s 
drafting or during the first decades of its implementation.  Remote sensing technology 
provides a powerful site characterization capability, and some new formats, such as 
Google Earth, are free and available to the public.  Although some software may not 
include the sophisticated analytical packages used by researchers, it has certainly 
democratized public use of landscape imagery.  The influence and analytical capabilities 
of this technology should be expected to grow for both research and public use purposes 
(NSTC 1997). 
The second scale, “National and Regional Resource Surveys,” is intended to 
evaluate certain physical properties of a region by sampling a subset of the total area, as 
opposed to the entire area. These monitoring efforts would target specific environmental 
concerns or a relatively small set of variables needed by resource managers.   These 
variables may have national or regional coverage depending on their relevance to 
management priorities.  Integration of scale 1 and 2 data can help provide “ground truth” 
calibration of remotely sensed data.  Scale 2 information quantifies conditions and 
changes in specific ecosystem types.  It is not the main priority of scale 2 monitoring, 
however, to investigate the cause or detailed features of a specific change.  Explaining 
causal relationships is the focus of scale 3 monitoring:  intensive monitoring and research 
or “index” sites.  Index sites monitor greater numbers of variables at higher frequency 
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than scales 1 and 2.  The central focus of scale 3 monitoring is explaining causal linkages 
and testing predictive models of environmental response.  The activities of the Long 
Term Ecological Research (LTER) Network are representative of scale 3 monitoring.  
Index sites can be fewer in number than scale 1 and 2 monitoring areas, but must be sited 
to achieve representation of all ecosystem types. 
Collectively, these three scales provide a useful general model for data collection 
and integration.  They advocate use of best available technology for ecosystem 
assessment and delineation.  Most importantly, they recognize the importance of 
scaleable results in ecological research and begin the discussion of appropriate scale of 
measurement. 
Heinz Center 
The comprehensive discussion continued in late 1997 under the leadership of the 
H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment (Heinz Center), 
which was commissioned for this effort by the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy.  The Heinz Center has published a series of reports on 
comprehensive ecological information, the first two of which can be discussed as one 
body.  “Designing a Report on the State of the Nation’s Ecosystems” (1999) provided 
explanation and justification for the format of their second report, “The State of the 
Nation’s Ecosystems: Measuring the Land, Waters, and Living Resources of the United 
States” (2002). 
 The Heinz reports contain some of the same themes as the NSTC report.  They 
once again stress the need for comprehensiveness, citing the importance of economic 
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indicators such as Gross Domestic Product; interest, unemployment, and inflation rates; 
and market indices such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average in managing the national 
economy. Management of the national environment similarly requires its own set of 
broad indicators (Heinz, 2002).  The “State of Nation’s Ecosystems” report uses 10 core 
indicators arranged among 4 categories.  These categories are: 1) “System Dimensions, 2) 
Chemical and Physical Conditions, 3) Biological Components, 4) Human Use.” 
While the NSTC report focused more on broad goals and appropriate scales of 
investigation, the Heinz report takes what may be considered a next logical step by 
proposing specific measurements of ecosystem condition.  Categories 2 and 3 contain 
most of the new proposals.  Category 2, “Chemical and Physical Conditions,” consists of 
two indicators: 1) “Movement of Nitrogen” and 2) “Chemical Contamination.”  
“Movement of Nitrogen” monitors both surface runoff non-point source pollution and 
groundwater nitrate contamination.  Non-point source pollution and its resulting hypoxic 
zone in the northern Gulf of Mexico have proved to be widespread, intractable problems.  
Their persistence suggests that traditional regulatory approaches such as the Clean Water 
Act are unsuited for diffuse, regional problems.  Such problems require a comprehensive 
management approach.  The Clean Water Act has certainly achieved other successes in 
multiple areas such as municipal wastewater treatment and industrial pollution control.  
This second component of Category 2, chemical contamination, includes point-source 
pollution covered by the Clean Water Act, non-point sources from agricultural runoff 
excluding nutrients, urban stormwater runoff, as well as a broad class of “emerging 
contaminants” such as hormones, pharmaceuticals, and antibiotics. 
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Category 3, “Biological Components”, contains three core indicators.  The first, 
“At-Risk Endangered Species,” encompasses plant and animal species in various stages 
of population decline, such as those listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).  The 
second indicator, “Condition of Plant and Animal Community,” measures habitat 
modification in ecosystems.  The third and final core biological indicator is “Plant 
Growth Index,” elsewhere referred to as net primary productivity.  This metric can be 
used to indicate changes in plant growth rates and species composition due to weather, 
climate, plant species succession, or habitat modification.  
Category 1 of the Heinz report, “System Dimensions,” does exhibit overlap with 
the NSTC framework for integration.  The NSTC framework proposes “Status of 
Ecosystems” as its very first indicator.  The framework suggests this objective be met 
through the increased use of remote sensing technology, coordinated with monitoring 
networks and highly-controlled index sites.  The Heinz,“State of the Nation’s 
Ecosystems, report describes “the area of an ecosystem [as] its most basic characteristic” 
(Heinz 2002, 2).   The proposed indicator should utilize the USGS Multiple Land 
Resolution Characterization (MRLC) Program and Earth Resources Observation System 
(EROS) as its data source.  Similarly, the NSTC report also cites the MRLC and EROS 
programs as best able to meet a “clear need for developing comprehensive and consistent 
land-cover and land-characteristics information for the United States” (NSTC, 1997).  
These congruities support an assertion that remotely-sensed national land use and 
ecosystem classification monitoring is the most fundamental of programs in any larger 
initiative of national ecological monitoring.   
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The fourth category of indicators in the Heinz report, “Human Uses, also overlaps 
with the NSTC proposed framework for integration.  The NSTC framework proposes to 
“relate status and trends to human and natural causes and consequences” as part of its 
second objective, “Causes and Consequences of Change” (NSTC 1997, viii).  The Heinz 
report, however, takes a decidedly different tack on the issue of human-induced 
ecological change and argues against such correlations: 
 
The Report will focus on the state of the Nation’s ecosystems, rather than 
environmental pressures that might change that state, or on the actions of 
government, private individuals, or businesses that might seek to affect 
that state. While information on pressures and responses clearly has its 
uses, the interpretation of such data presents additional challenges to the 
scientific credibility and political legitimacy of a reporting effort. The 
Design Committee therefore decided to limit the Report to the single, 
crucial task of characterizing the status of the Nation’s ecosystems. The 
Committee is confident that there is no shortage of groups both within and 
outside government that would use a credible, unbiased Report on the 
State of the Nation’s Ecosystems in their own efforts to interpret, change, 
or design policy. (Heinz 1999, xii) 
 
Thus, a notable addition to the Heinz reports is the inclusion of political concerns.  While 
the 1997 NSTC report only mentioned the word “political” one time in a 102-page 
document, the Heinz reports confront the issue of politics in several instances and argue 
for a measure of scientific detachment consistent with NEPA principles.  In this respect, 
their report advocates a rational comprehensive focus.  An indicator system should 
provide the data needed to propose and evaluate policy choices, but should remain 
separate from evaluation itself and any eventual decision-making.  The use of indicator 
data for program development should be performed by personnel, institutions, and 
funding streams separate from monitoring.  This acknowledgement of political concern 
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may be interpreted as a more pragmatic assessment of the barriers to actually passing a 
national ecological indicator system into public law.  These concerns may also reflect 
changes in the larger political environment which have made federal environmental 
policy decisions controversial and subject to local revolt (Doremus and Tarlock 2008). 
National Research Council  
During development and publication of the Heinz reports, the National Research 
Council of the National Academy of Sciences (NRC) was simultaneously commissioned 
by EPA to produce its own report titled, “Ecological Indicators for the Nation”, published 
in 2000.  Both the timing and substance of the NRC and Heinz reports are close to 
identical.  The NRC report proposes eleven core indictors among three indictor 
categories.  Their proposals are as follows: 
 
• As indicators of the extent and status of the nation’s ecosystems, the 
committee recommends land cover and land use. 
• As indicators of the nation’s ecological capital, the committee 
recommends total species diversity, native species diversity, nutrient runoff, and 
soil organic matter. 
• As indictors of ecological functioning or performance, the committee 
recommends carbon storage, production capacity, net primary production, lake 
trophic status, stream oxygen, and for agricultural ecosystems, nutrient-use 
efficiency and nutrient balance (NRC 2000). 
 
The NRC committee’s first indictor bears considerable similarity to the NSTC’s “Status 
of Ecosystems” objective and Heinz reports’ “System Dimensions” indicator.  In all three 
instances, ecosystem extent and status are listed as the proposal’s first and most important 
informational requirement.  The NRC’s second and third indicators, “Ecological Capital” 
and “Ecological Functioning,” closely parallel the Heinz Center’s second and third 
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indicators, “chemical and physical conditions” and “biological components.”  Both sets 
emphasize measures of species abundance, species interactions, nutrient fluxes, and 
biogeochemical cycling.   
Though the NRC and Heinz reports are surely not the first time the federal 
government has duplicated its own efforts, this duplication is instructive in several 
respects.  First, the duplication is demonstrative of a clear need for comprehensive, 
integrated environmental reporting.  Second, the similarities between each of the two 
proposals suggest that a functional ecological monitoring framework is closer to, rather 
than further from, scientific consensus. Once scientific agreement has taken place, only 
political will remains.  Third, the duplication hints at a degree of institutional 
territorialism.  The Heinz report was commissioned by the White House Office of 
Science and Technology Policy which, like CEQ, is within the Executive Office of the 
President.  Given the institutional proximity of OSTP to CEQ, it is at least reasonable to 
consider the possibility that federal production of this report would eventually be 
coordinated within the EOP, possibly by CEQ, either through legislation or Executive 
Order.  The National Research Council report, however, was commissioned by a specific 
agency within the Executive – EPA – which may have aspirations toward a larger or even 
unitary role in ecosystem management.  Since the elimination of CEQ’s annual report, an 
administrative void exists which, if eventually filled, will be a source of additional 
funding and responsibilities.  Federal agencies certainly tend to seek more power and 
authority as it may become available rather than less.  EPA’s subsequent actions follow 
this pattern. 
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Enviromental Protection Agency (EPA) 
EPA’s desire to play an expanded role in development and oversight of national 
ecological monitoring and reporting was made clear with the publication of its 2003 
“Draft Report on the Environment Technical Document” (DROE).  Although this was 
only an initial attempt as the title suggests, its presence laid EPA’s claim to a role in 
comprehensive environmental reporting.  The 457-page document lives up to its title as a 
“Technical Document,” contains thorough discussions of complex scientific issues, and 
reads as if the target audience were presumed to be environmental scientists with doctoral 
degrees.  Its usability by lay policy-makers and generalist legislative staffers is 
questionable.  Its contents and conclusions require a fair amount of interpretation, making 
the document somewhat inaccessible to a broad policy audience. 
Air quality, water quality, toxic chemicals, and their intersection with human 
health comprise much of the report, consistent with EPA’s legislative charge.  Of the five 
“theme areas” in the DROE – “Clear Air, Purer Water , Better Protected Land, Human 
Health” – the last, titled “Ecological Condition”, strictly focuses on ecosystems as the 
primary unit of analysis.  The DROE acknowledges in the first page of the ecological 
conditions section that its indicator choices were heavily influenced by the 2002 Heinz 
Center report.  Following a dominant theme from not only the Heinz Center, but also the 
NSTC and NRC reports, the DROE lists “ecosystem extent” as the primary indicator 
parameter for the first five of its six proposed ecosystem classes.  These classes are: 1) 
forests, 2) farmlands, 3) grasslands/shrublands, 4) urban/suburban land, 5) freshwaters, 
and 6) coasts/oceans.  The DROE proposes a seventh category of indicators which would 
apply to the “Entire Nation” and all ecosystem types.  The six proposed indictors are: 
 54 
“ecosystem extent, at-risk native species, bird community index, terrestrial plant growth 
index, movement of nitrogen, and chemical contamination.”  As with the Heinz and NRC 
proposals, these physical indicators reflect broad metrics of chemical cycling in the 
environment as well as plant & animal population biology.  And, again, “ecosystem 
extent” is listed first, implying its primacy in a larger system of metrics. 
 
Institutional and Political Focus (2004-2007) 
Government Accountability Office 
Despite EPA’s initial entry into comprehensive ecological reporting, the federal 
government still perceived both the substance and institutional home for coordination of 
national ecological information to be undecided as of 2004.  In this year, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) published, “Environmental Indicators: Better Coordination is 
Needed to Develop Environmental Indicator Sets that Inform Decisions.”  The report can 
best be described as 1) a survey of important monitoring efforts at state, regional, and 
federal scales, and 2) a discussion of the institutional challenges to development and 
administration of a coordinated system.  Both the Heinz Center “Status of Ecosystems” 
(2002) report and EPA “Draft Report on the Environment” are referenced in detail.  The 
GAO report does not discuss the merits of specific physical indicators.  Rather, it 
addresses the process and bureaucratic issues involved in the adoption of an indicator 
system.  In this respect, it can be seen as marking the start of a new focus on the path 
toward national ecological indicators.  This focus accepts that the technical and scientific 
aspects of indicator development are well underway — as evidenced by the NSTC, NRC, 
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Heinz Center, and EPA reports — and that the next visible challenges on the horizon are 
of a political and administrative nature. 
As its title suggests, the core theme of the GAO report is that administrative 
coordination has not been achieved.  It does not, however, make strong recommendations 
for where leadership of this effort should be centered.  Although an explicit statement is 
not made, the report seems to imply a slightly rising role for EPA and slightly waning 
role for CEQ.  The report credits CEQ with contributions made since 2002 by its 
Interagency Working Group on Indicator Coordination as “promising, but they lack the 
long-term, stable institutional arrangements needed to ensure continued guidance and 
coordination of federal activity in this area” (GAO 2004).  The GAO offers only 
marginally more praise for EPA’s success at comprehensive monitoring: 
 
The previous EPA efforts have been hindered not only by technical 
difficulties in establishing linkages between program activities and 
changes in the environment, but also by changes in leadership within the 
agency and the lack of needed resources for monitoring environmental 
conditions. Monitoring activities have had trouble in competing for limited 
resources with EPA’s regulatory programs and activities. Recently, the 
Administrator of EPA has endorsed the continuation of the agency’s 
indicators initiative in principle, and EPA has included the initiative as a 
performance measure in its annual performance plan for data quality 
activities.  (GAO 2004, 7) 
 
Though the above passage may not qualify as a strong endorsement of EPA’s past 
approach to coordination, it is important in two respects.  First, it cites the need for 
leadership and resources in achieving comprehensive environmental monitoring.  The 
implication is that if EPA simply had the resources, it would be a logical institution to 
lead the coordination effort.  Second, it does give credit to the initial, tentative steps the 
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EPA Administrator has taken with its indicators initiative.  This statement suggests that 
where there is the political will, there is a way.  These first steps occurred from 2001-
2003 under the leadership of Christine Todd Whitman, former Republican Governor of 
New Jersey. The forward progress on comprehensive monitoring during this period is 
somewhat surprising, given the low relative status of environmental issues in the larger 
sphere of Bush administration policy priorities.  These efforts may be cynically 
interpreted as chasing a mirage, an exercise in pursuing a goal that has not been 
actualized despite years of attempts and some may not view as achievable.  Alternatively, 
these efforts – occurring even in an unsupportive political environment – suggest a 
permanence to this unfulfilled need.  
Additional comments in the GAO report elaborate on the relationship between 
political climate and indicator development.  The GAO argues for a science-based, 
collaborative process of indicator development that is at the same time inclusive and 
expert-driven.  In these respects, their preferred development approach is consistent with 
both rational comprehensive planning and NEPA principles as practiced in Section 
102(2)(c).  The authors also acknowledge the challenge that this process-centered 
approach presents: 
 
Developers reported that support for an indicator set can be undermined if 
it is viewed as biased because of its association with a particular political 
perspective or leader. The process of developing an indicator set can be an 
intensely political process that challenges both the credibility and 
relevance of a set. Developers of the sets we reviewed largely relied on 
collaborative processes to define the purpose and intended use of the 
indicator set, determine the conceptual model and criteria for select 
indicators, and selecting the indicators themselves. Such processes are 




It is difficult to interpret whether such a statement supports or undermines consideration 
of CEQ as institutional home for indicator development.  As Chapter Three established, 
CEQ has been largely unable to detach itself from the political priorities of the President 
since the Reagan administration.   Caldwell cites the blurring of responsibilities between 
the EOP and White House Staff as the cause of CEQ’s political turmoil (Caldwell, 1997).  
In the most recent administration of George W. Bush, CEQ was used as a tool to refute 
and wage an information campaign against accepted climate science.  
CEQ Interagency Working Group 
Nevertheless, during this same period CEQ was moving forward in fulfillment of 
its own comprehensive mandate, undeterred by EPA’s entry into what some might have 
still considered to be CEQ’s turf.  CEQ’s actions over the next several years sought to 
restore this mandate after having been diminished by FRESA and the elimination of its 
annual environmental quality report.  In a memo distributed on December 31, 2002, then 
CEQ Chairman, James Connaughton, created the “Interagency Working Group on 
Indicator Coordination” (Working Group) composed of representatives from the 
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Health and Human Services, the 
Interior, and Transportation, as well as EPA and the White House Offices of the Federal 
Environmental Executive, Management and Budget, and Science and Technology Policy 
(GAO 2004).  The Working Group’s first meeting was convened in March, 2003, ”to 
consider ways to enhance the nation’s capacity to regularly report on natural and 
environmental resources, as well as related health, social, and economic factors, using a 
comprehensive set of indicators” (GAO 2004, 34).  This effort was to be conducted in 
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furtherance of NEPA’s requirement that CEQ “document and define changes and trends 
in the natural environment, and accumulate the necessary data and other information for a 
continuing analysis of such changes and trends and an interpretation of their underlying 
causes” (GAO 2004, 34). 
From 2003 to 2006, the Working Group developed an “approach and policy 
framework” that sought to define both the process of indicator development and provide 
it with a strong theoretical foundation (GAO 2004, 34).  An “Integration and Synthesis” 
subgroup was also convened to evaluate key federal and non-federal efforts in the context 
of a systems approach.  A systems approach emphasizes linkages and relationships as a 
primary unit of analysis.  This work eventually produced a general conceptual framework 
to guide indicator selection, application, and incorporation of data and information 
technology resources.  This period from 2003 to 2006 can be viewed as the Working 
Group’s technical and process-centered focus. 
National Academy of Public Administrators 
In 2006, CEQ and the U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) commissioned the 
National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) “for assistance in assessing 
institutional options for developing and reporting national environmental indicators” 
(NAPA 2007, 1).  Commissioning of this report marked a shift in focus of the Working 
Group from technical to institutional.  The eventual product from NAPA was the 2007 
report, “Green Compass: Institutional Options for Developing a National System of 
Environmental Indicators”.  The report is structured around a “mantra” of “think big, start 
small, and ramp up fast” (NAPA 2007, 10).  It proposes the eventual adoption of cross-
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cutting, “headline indicators” that will “serve as a focal point of public discussion” 
(NAPA 2007, x).  Despite their comprehensive nature, NAPA also proposed that these 
indicators be implemented in incremental fashion in the form of a pilot program 
addressing water quantity issues.  The pilot program should generate interest among and 
demonstrate value to state and local governments.  This seeming contradiction between a 
comprehensive focus and an incremental implementation is not well explained in Green 
Compass.  The proposed strategy seems very tentative, possibly premature.  The implied 
risk is that if the pilot program does not go well, then the larger effort is jeopardized.  
While this approach may offer pragmatism in considering the sizable challenge of 
national indicator creation and the resources it may be expected to require, the questions 
of how programmatic pieces will be added and integrated later to achieve a synthesized, 
comprehensive whole is left unanswered.  The report’s “Ramp up Fast” recommendation 
simply argues that with enough momentum, the larger goals can be achieved.  In a 
general sense, Green Compass does not seem to have the breadth and depth of prior 
reports, especially with regard to the scientific and technical challenges of integration.  
This is understandable given NAPA’s mission and areas of expertise, but this bias causes 
the report to seem insufficient by the standard of previous reports.    
The one area in which this report does excel, however, is evaluating the merits 
and drawbacks of various institutional homes for this effort.  Their recommendation very 
honestly and openly acknowledges the political considerations of each choice.  This 
builds on political themes raised in both the Heinz Center and GAO reports.  The NAPA 
assessments deserve to be quoted in full despite their length: 
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Where to Anchor the Leadership Body 
Four options have been identified for anchoring the Leadership Council or 
other primary entity: the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) or another federal agency. As the white paper 
discusses, the central challenge is vesting the entity with sufficient clout to 
ensure effective coordination by multiple agencies while providing checks 
and balances to protect against the reality or appearance of political 
manipulation. 
• The advantage of making OMB the locus for anchoring the indicator 
system is its unmatched clout. The disadvantage is the perception of some 
federal agencies and some states that OMB’s primary focus is on cutting 
federal spending and reducing the information collection burden. 
• The role initially envisioned for CEQ by the National Environmental 
Policy Act seems to make it a logical locus. However, CEQ has not 
fulfilled that vision in any Administration and its historic role as the 
President’s policy advisor carries strong political associations that would 
require insulation or checks and balances to protect the indicator system’s 
credibility. In addition, the political priorities of CEQ’s leadership on 
behalf of the President, especially at the beginning of a new 
Administration, might work to eclipse attention to the design of an 
environmental indicator system. 
• Although time did not permit its full consideration, OSTP might deserve 
further consideration. For example, its Committee on Environment and 
Natural Resources has experience in coordinating interagency efforts. 
However, OSTP lacks the political imperative of CEQ and its mission is 
focused primarily on science and technology (NAPA 2007, 9). 
 
The negative assessment on the appropriateness of CEQ to lead this effort echoes themes 
from the historical analysis presented in Chapter Three.  As that chapter recounted, CEQ 
has had a rocky history and received, at best, mixed support from Congress and the 
Executive.  The Clinton administration implied that CEQ was institutionally redundant 
when it supported H.R.3512, which proposed to “abolish” CEQ and elevate EPA to 
cabinet status.  Such history does suggest there is some political risk in locating a new 
initiative within CEQ.  Lindblom’s procedural rationality acknowledges that program 
administration is subject to the constraints of that institution tasked with implementing it.  
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There is a measure of doubt as to CEQ’s capacity for strong guidance and leadership on 
program implementation.  The history of political interference with CEQ suggests that 
future programs may be heavily influenced by Presidential priorities to their benefit or 
detriment. 
Current Status and Conclusions 
At present, the only published product of CEQ’s work toward national indicator 
development is a “National Environmental Status and Trends Indicators” (NEST) internet 
website using water as a case example. Across the top of the website are the words 
“DRAFT WEBSITE” in large, bold script.  Near the title area, the website states “This 
website has not been officially launched, is under development, and is subject to change” 
(http://www.fs.fed.us/NEST/index.shtml).  The website has not added content nor 
expanded in scope beyond the pilot area of water since mid-2009.  At the very bottom of 
the page, the following is written: “Last modified: Friday, 22-May-2009 17:48:06 EDT.” 
Thus, it appears the effort has been temporarily halted, if not eliminated. 
There is no mention of or link to the NEST website on CEQ’s official government 
website as of March 17, 2010 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq).  In 
fact, the current CEQ website contains no references to NEPA’s comprehensive mandate.  
Under the page’s “initiatives” tab, the only mention of NEPA is in one of out seven 
current initiatives.  This initiative is titled, “Steps to Modernize and Reinvigorate NEPA.”  
It contains four proposals: 1) when and how Federal agencies must consider greenhouse 
gas emissions and climate change in their proposed actions; 2) clarifying appropriateness 
of “Findings of No Significant Impact” and specifying when there is a need to monitor 
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environmental mitigation commitments; 3) clarifying use of categorical exclusions; and 
4) enhanced public tools for reporting on NEPA activities (CEQ, 2010).  These priorities 
relate exclusively to Section 102(2)(c) requirements.  Thus, the Obama administration 
has effectively abandoned national indicator development, the contributions of the Bush 
Administration CEQ toward that goal, and a comprehensive Title II mandate.  These 
developments support the argument that CEQ offers little in the way of program 
continuity beyond agency guidance toward satisfying the legal requirements of Section 
102(2)(c). 
Publication of EPA’s 2008 “Report on the Environment,” formalized EPA’s 
ongoing intent to maintain an institutional presence in comprehensive environmental 
reporting.  EPA may be considered as competing with CEQ for similar resources despite 
CEQ’s much smaller funding and staffing levels.  The report is very similar in format to 
its 2003 predecessor, “Draft Report on the Environment Technical Document.”  Thus, it 
appears that, at present, EPA is winning the battle for leadership on comprehensive 
ecological monitoring and reporting.  The degree to which EPA will devote the necessary 
resources to this effort remains to be seen, especially given their new responsibilities in 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions. 
The reports analyzed above demonstrate a need for comprehensiveness in 
environmental information.  The first body of reports – the NSTC, NRC, Heinz, and EPA 
DROE reports – address primarily scientific, technical, and methodological challenges in 
the creation of a national ecological indicator system.  The reports display considerable 
overlap on core indicator proposals, suggesting scientific consensus is closer to rather 
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than further from achievement.  All reports propose a national land use and ecosystem 
extent inventory as their primary metric. 
The second set of reports — consisting primarily of the GAO and NAPA reports, 
but also some content in the Heinz reports — treat the challenge of achieving political, 
institutional, and procedural consensus.  This is admittedly more difficult.  They raise the 
issue of what institution should lead a national ecological indicator system.  CEQ does 
not receive a favorable assessment.  At times, it appears CEQ and EPA are cooperators, 
but in other instances they appear to be competitors, simultaneously but separately 
working toward the same goal. 
The above histories raise the possibility that even modest achievement of CEQ’s 
comprehensive mandate may be a distant prospect.  While the contributions of this 
decade-long effort to prompt the development of national ecological indicators still 
appear in a figurative rear-view mirror, it is appropriate to imagine — if only as a thought 
exercise — what a comprehensive product put out by CEQ might look like.  This product 
must be reasonable in scope, low cost, and relate to possible future establishment of a 








Chapter 5: A Proposal for National Impact Analysis 
 
 
Chapter Four established three important themes.  First, a series of reports and 
initiatives proposing national ecological indicators demonstrates a national need for 
comprehensive ecological information and assessment.  Second, the most fundamental 
feature of these reports was the proposal of a national land use and ecosystem inventory.  
Third, CEQ may not be the clear institutional home for comprehensive ecological 
monitoring.  At best, CEQ has received mixed political support over the last three 
decades and now faces competition with EPA for authority and resources to maintain a 
comprehensive environmental charge. 
Nonetheless, when viewed together these three factors may still suggest a path 
forward for CEQ.  Although its formal annual environmental report to the President and 
the Congress was eliminated with FRESA, CEQ still has a mandate that relates to Title II 
of NEPA. 
Until 2000, the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
was required to transmit an annual environmental quality report to 
Congress.  Although the annual reporting requirement is no longer in 
effect, CEQ is still required to accumulate the necessary data and other 
information needed for a continuing analysis of changes and trends in the 
natural environment and an interpretation of their underlying causes. 
Whereas scientists, agency officials, and academicians generally agree on 
the need for periodic reporting of conditions and trends of environmental 
and natural resources, no consensus has been reached on who should be 
responsible for this task or how it would be best achieved (GAO 2004, 18) 
 
The fact that this mandate was pursued by CEQ during the Bush administration – an 
administration that otherwise might be remembered as reluctantly or non-supportive of 
environmental values – suggests that CEQ will pursue its comprehensive mandate until it 
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is either eliminated or EPA is solely charged with these responsibilities.  The above 
passage also supports an assertion that it is yet undetermined who will lead in the area of 
comprehensive environmental information. 
A Possible CEQ Comprehensive Product and Its Features 
To maintain its Title II relevance, CEQ’s path forward must involve several 
features.  First, CEQ must differentiate itself from the focus EPA has taken with respect 
to comprehensive ecological reporting and monitoring.  It must acknowledge that EPA 
has considerably more staffing, funds, and public name recognition.  Thus, it is 
imperative that CEQ put out a product that is separate and distinct from one expected to 
be pursued by EPA such as its 2008 Report on the Environment.  As discussed in Chapter 
3, EPA’s approach to ecological indicators is but one effort in five that also aim to 
address water, air, human health, and toxic pollution.  Furthermore, the EPA 2003 Draft 
Report on the Environment and 2008 Report on the Environment are highly technical 
documents that require significant knowledge of environmental science and chemistry to 
be understood.  The metrics and concepts presented in each are not easily communicable 
to laymen. 
Thus, any comprehensive product from CEQ must be accessible as a primary 
goal.  It must inform the public as well as experts.  It must strive not only for scientific 
understanding of environment impacts, but social, economic, and historical impacts as 
well.  A comprehensive product from CEQ must also focus specifically on human-
environmental interaction and evaluate this balance as its primary unit of analysis.  The 
selection of a unit of analysis that frames environmental impact in clear human terms 
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buttresses this product’s companion goal of accessibility.  Parts per billion, micrograms 
per liter, or a sigmoid-shaped model of species population decline read as distant 
numbers on a paper to those without subject-specific environmental science training.  
When this language becomes de rigeur, it limits the extent to which environmental values 
and knowledge can be shared by a broad cross-section of American society.  
In other words, CEQ’s contribution to comprehensiveness in ecological 
information must stay true to NEPA principles of interdisciplinarity, public accessibility, 
impact analysis, and regard for the future.  Environmental science has progressed far in 
the 40 years since NEPA’s passage.  NEPA deserves credit for helping to initiate this 
growth in environmental science.  What has not been achieved over the past 40 years, 
however, is updating the operative features of NEPA to utilize the latest methods in 
environmental science and assessment. 
Integration of Ecological Footprint Analysis 
At its core, NEPA is concerned with human impacts on the environment.  While 
NEPA surely has curbed the impacts of various agency actions, its overall thrust is not 
rigid adherence to the minimization of impacts, but rather, an informed understanding of 
them.  The most well-defined and well-practiced example is Section 102(2)(c).  This 
Section operates under the assumption that when impacts are understood, agencies, 
business interests, and the public will hopefully anticipate, plan for, and modify their 
actions in ways that consider environmental impacts ahead of project development.  Just 
as NEPA provides guidance to agencies on impact analysis, it is also capable of 
providing guidance to the nation on ecological impacts. This guiding role is the essence 
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of Title II and the remaining charge of CEQ as evidenced by the GAO quote above.   
Thus, one of the most valuable contributions NEPA has made and must continue to make 
into the future is as a framework for understanding. 
Ecological Footprint analysis is a prominent and accessible method for 
quantifying individual ecological impact.  An ecological footprint is that area of land 
required to support a human being at a given level of affluence.  A footprint most directly 
represents how humans impact the land (Merkel 2003).  The area represents the flows of 
nature needed to sustain human life and absorb its waste.  A precise definition of an 
ecological footprint has been offered by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF)  as “the area of 
biologically productive land and water needed to provide ecological resources and 
services – food, fibre, and timber, land on which to build, and land to absorb carbon 
dioxide (CO2) released by burning fossil fuels” (WWF 2008, 14). 
Ecological Footprinting (EF) addresses biophysical limits to resource use.  Unlike 
other methodologies of environmental accounting, EF places humanity as a subsystem 
within a larger global ecosystem.  This arrangement acknowledges that humans are 
dependent on the natural environment not only as the source of wealth creation, but 
survival.  Dominant economic models integrating environmental considerations view the 
natural environment as something external to human society and market structures (Daly 
2004).  EF acknowledges human dependence on environmental services and flows much 
more directly and, many may argue, accurately.  Services provided by healthy intact 
ecosystems include: 
• supporting services such as nutrient cycling, soil formation and primary 
production 
• provisioning services such as the production of food, freshwater, materials or fuel 
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• regulating services including climate and flood regulation, water purification, 
pollination and pest control 
• cultural (including aesthetic, spiritual, educational and recreational) services 
(WWF 2008, 4) 
 
 
The methodological and normative problem of valuing biological life and ecological 
systems in dollar amounts is altogether avoided.  Ecological Footprinting can be used to 
represent human impacts in any possible system of economic organization because the 
unit of analysis is not dollars, but land area. 
  The WWF’s “Living Planet Report 2008” provides details on both EF concepts 
and actual data.  A more in-depth examination of the WWF framework is instructive in 
understanding this analytical tool and global patterns of resource consumption.  The 
WWF framework divides a total footprint into six component parts:  “built up land, 
fishing ground, forests, grazing land, cropland, and carbon footprint”.  These six 
categories provide a manageable set of variables with the breadth to understand 
differences in consumption and impact.  These categories are summed to provide a total 
ecological footprint.  Footprints can be calculated at individual, regional, and national 
scales.  To illustrate, Appendix Three presents national ecological footprints for several 
nations, regions, and income classes. 
An ecological footprint provides an accessible, meaningful measure of 
environmental demand, but this figure represents only half of the picture.  The other half 
of the picture is environmental supply or biocapacity.  A national land use and ecosystem 
inventory provides an exciting intersection with EF analysis in this respect. 
Chapter 4 established that the most fundamental feature of any ecological 
indicator system is a measurement of ecosystem extent.  There is evidence that someday 
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this indicator may be formalized as a national land use and ecosystem inventory.  This 
measure can be remotely sensed at relatively low cost and requires little physical 
sampling of private property.  Current sources for these data include the USGS Multiple 
Land Resolution Characterization (MRLC) Program and Earth Resources Observation 
System (EROS). 
With detailed, publically-available comprehensive national land use and 
ecosystem data, EF analysis can be conducted at local, regional, and national scales.  The 
ecosystem extent metric proposed by the reports in Chapter Four is the starting point for 
this effort.  Currently, most efforts at ecological footprint analysis such as those of the 
WWF are conducted at national scales.  NEPA as a national policy is not solely about 
top-down, federal authority to compel or coerce environmental responsibility.  Given its 
emphasis on public involvement and participation, NEPA is only comprehensive to the 
extent that it provides a framework that can be used by local efforts and integrate the 
information they produce.  With a comprehensive ecosystem inventory in place, the 
nation can much more accurately evaluate its footprint at all geographic scales.  Two 
simple formulas can be used to operationalize and evaluate environmental impact.  The 
synthesis integrates a national land use and ecosystem inventory and environmental 
impact at any scales.  These formulas are: 
 
Ecological Demand: 




Land Area x Bioproductivity = BioCapacity 
 
Ecological Demand – Ecological Supply = Ecological “Overshoot” (WWF 2008, 23) 
 
As can be seen from above, land area is an important term in this series of equations.  A 
national ecological indicator system as proposed by the reports analyzed in Chapter Four 
would also provide improved quantification of both changes in ecosystem area as well as 
ecosystem condition.  Bioproductivity is directly related to ecosystem condition.  This 
framework provides a quantifiable, yet easily comprehensible, analytical method for 
directly evaluating environmental impacts.  It is applicable at all geographic scales for 
which the data exist.  It is a means for operationalizing, rather simply, a varied, yet 
manageable set of six specific impacts.  These impacts are not abstract, inaccessible 
concepts but directly relate to humanity’s capacity to sustain itself. 
 This framework is also a means for better understanding environmental 
degradation.  When environmental demand exceeds environmental supply, overshoot 
results.  Currently, the WWF value for world average ecological footprint is 2.7 global 
hectares (gha) per person (WWF 2008, 14).  The current world biocapacity is 2.1 global 
gha per person.  This results in an overshoot of 0.6 hectares per person. 
 This overshoot figure represents two processes.  First, overshoot degrades the 
bioproductive capacity of our existing ecosystems.  In other words, overshoot diminishes 
the capacity of these ecosystems to regenerate themselves and provide humanity with the 
ecosystem services defined above.  Second, this overshoot, or “ecological debt” as it is 
also termed, is effectively the borrowing of natural capital from future generations.  Later 
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generations will inherit ecosystems with degraded biocapacity capable of producing less 
food, fuel, fiber, and minerals.  This ecological debt carries with it the risk that this 
impaired biocapacity will be insufficient to sustain human life at projected population 
levels.  When major populations and areas of the world are faced with survival 
challenges, a host of political, national security, social, and ethical issues appear 
alongside the problems of physical survival.  It is a future that a broader audience of 
policy-makers should be interested in preventing.  
Relevance of Informational Product to Title I & II 
 Thus, a national land use inventory combined with EF provides a method for 
operationalizing two of NEPA’s most difficult aspirations: 1) balancing resource use with 
population and 2) intergenerational equity.  Clearly, population is possibly one of the 
most difficult, if not the most difficult, policy areas about which to have a rational policy 
discussion.  But this methodology treats it as neutrally as any conceptual framework can.  
Population is an integral term in these equations as an increase in population requires a 
decrease in consumption or resource use intensity if a given ecological footprint is to 
remain constant.  Otherwise, the ecological footprint value will increase which produces 
a corresponding decrease in biocapacity as these resources are overutilized.  When these 
values are simultaneously moving in opposite directions, ecological overshoot is 
magnified. 
Intergenerational equity, or the conservation of the environment for future 
generations, is a strong theme in NEPA.  To the cynic, this language appears as overly 
ambitious fluff.  To the environmental impact analyst using the framework presented 
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above, intergenerational equity is not simply symbolic language, but something that can 
be quantified with precision and rigor.  Ecological overshoot is the ultimate measure of 
unsustainability.  In a new and rapidly expanding environmental discourse, sustainability 
is a popular buzzword that may produce a range of definitions.  In an EF framework, 
sustainability is very easy to define as that point where ecological footprint equals 
available biocapacity.  Ecological debt is not being incurred at the expense of future 
generations.  Current generations are valuing obligations to the future through the use of 
resources relative to their availability.  While one perspective may view such 
considerations as largely aspirational and unattainable, another perspective sees them as 
instrumental to the civil progress of human society. 
 
The discussion above suggests that a necessary and logical updating of NEPA’s 
comprehensive mandate must include some component of ecological footprint analysis.  
This incorporation could take a couple of different forms.  The first and most obvious 
form is the resumption of some informational product from CEQ.  As Chapter Four 
demonstrated, this product must be cost-efficient, differentiate itself from the work of 
EPA, and be accessible to the public. 
Thus, some sort of web-based information clearinghouse combining national land 
use and ecosystem extent data with ecological footprint data and calculators seems 
appropriate to both CEQ’s resources and the larger intent of NEPA.  The success of this 
product should not be measured in its capacity to produce substantive policy change, but 
rather its reception by the public.  It should be designed as an educational tool for 
secondary education, post-secondary education, and academic research.  It should contain 
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an accessible user interface with graphical presentations, yet also support research efforts 
by making available various datasets in spreadsheet and GIS formats.  
 EF analysis might also be incorporated into Title I NEPA processes.  Various 
authors such as Karkainnen (2002), as well as the present CEQ, have identified a need to 
identify environmental mitigation commitments over time.  Such efforts also have the 
potential to be brought into a comprehensive impact framework.  Those projects which 
avoid the EIS process through mitigation should have their mitigation efforts monitored 
as a unique class of index site, similar to those described in the NSTC framework.  
Though this site would not be located in a relatively undisturbed ecosystem as many 
index sites would be, its usefulness to a comprehensive framework would be equally 
important.  Just as there is a need to study structure and function of intact ecosystems, 
there is also a need to study structure and function of impaired, degraded, or otherwise 
modified ecosystems.  As humanity continues to put more pressure on its ecological 
supply, increasing areas of bioproductive land will be impacted.  These impacts may alter 
the land completely or they may have more subtle affects on bioproductivity.  The extent 
to which various types of development affects the bioproductivity of surrounding areas is 
likely to have tremendous importance to the future as more marginal areas will be put to 
use for purposes of food, fuel, and fiber production.  These possible “Mitigation Index 
Sites” would offer the low documentation benefits of the EA Æ Mitigated FONSI 
process, but would make an important scientific and informational contribution to a 
comprehensive framework. 
The established scientific consensus and corresponding public discourse related to 
climate change suggests its presence as a dominant environmental policy issue for some 
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time.  This shift in both governmental and public perceptions is laudable, but must be 
understood not just as a measure of carbon ppb.  In other words, this problem will require 
framing in both atmospheric and ecological terms.  Forest and marine ecosystems are 
carbon sinks.  Previous carbon balance relationships will be disturbed as these systems 
are needed to uptake and store increasing amounts of atmospheric carbon.  Their capacity 
to provide this ecological service is directly related to their ecological structure and 
function.  When these are altered, the biocapacity of these systems to perform needed 
ecological services may be diminished. 
Thus, it is clear that any effort to plan for and mitigate effects of climate change 
must account for ecosystem integrity and function.  A system of national ecological 
indicators and its primary metric of ecosystem extent are instrumental components in 
ecosystem management of climate change and its effects.  The growing use and adoption 
of carbon footprinting establishes footprinting generally as an accepted, informative, and 
useful means of operationalizing environmental impact at individual, organizational, 
regional and national scales.  These methods should also be utilized by NEPA.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Possibilities 
 
At its outset, this analysis asked two primary research questions.  The first 
question asked was, “What impediments prevent the achievement of NEPA’s rational 
comprehensive focus?”  Chapters Two and Three identified bounds to NEPA’s rational 
comprehensive policy intent.  The second question asked was, “How might NEPA 
resume a comprehensive focus?”  Chapters Four and Five provided relevant background 
and a proposal for resumption of the rational comprehensive policy intent contained in 
Title II of NEPA.  
Concerning the first research question, NEPA is legally constrained by the 
statute’s lack of positive law, easily interpreted and enforced by the courts.  This has led 
the federal judiciary to interpret NEPA as a procedural statute requiring agency 
compliance with only one line of the act – Section 102(2)(c) – the EIS requirement.  
While the EIS “hard look” test that has evolved in the courts has surely led some 
damaging projects to be cancelled or modified, the hard look test is now being applied 
less, in favor of less rigorous NEPA processes with fewer alternatives analyzed and less 
public involvement. 
Administratively, NEPA has been affected by three decades of political 
interference with CEQ and Title II.  Distinctions between White House Staff and the 
Executive Office of the President have blurred over time making CEQ subject to the 
priorities of the Executive and offering it scarce autonomy.  The legislative branch has 
also failed to understand the role of CEQ.  Its lack of support culminated in the 
elimination of CEQ’s annual environmental report in 1995. 
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 Despite this setback, CEQ and a range of other policy actors made forward 
progress on the development of a national ecological indicator system during the late 
1990s and early 2000s.  Although a system has not been adopted as of yet, this period 
was productive in terms of progress on conceptualization, methodological challenges, and 
institutional issues.  Each indicator development proposal cites “ecosystem extent” as the 
primary metric in any larger framework.  These efforts demonstrate a need for 
comprehensive environmental information currently absent from the federal government.  
A call for national ecological indicators also suggests an answer to the second question 
research question of, “How might NEPA resume a comprehensive focus?” 
One alternative is presented in this paper.  A possible national land use and 
ecosystem inventory can be tightly integrated into Ecological Footprinting as a 
methodology for national impact analysis.  Such a framework offers the sometimes 
competing benefits of both quantitative rigor and conceptual accessibility.  It is 
applicable to local, regional, and national scales making it a truly comprehensive form of 
impact analysis.  It reinforces private sector efforts at environmental responsibility and 
can provide oversight and guidance with respect to methodological rigor.  It addresses 
NEPA aspirations that are difficult to operationalize such as intergenerational equity.  A 
web-based informational product using this methodology is within CEQ’s resource 
constraints and can make considerable use of existing datasets.  This product would also 
be a contribution unique from those being developed by U.S. EPA.  
As Chapter Three demonstrated, the future possibility of restoring NEPA’s 
comprehensive mandate depends on the political will of our national leadership.  Much of 
the progress toward ecological indicator development occurred during a Presidential 
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administration that showed little interest or concern for environmental issues beyond the 
creation of several offshore marine sanctuaries.  Thus, comprehensiveness in 
environmental information should never really be considered a “dead” issue, just one that 
is temporarily at the margins of the environmental policy discourse. 
Another alternative is to leave this issue at the edge of our national priorities and 
take no action to restore NEPA’s comprehensive mandate.  This alternative is 
problematic in several respects.  In broad terms, it perpetuates a disconnect between the 
environment and human welfare.  Our world economy views ecosystems as a source of 
wealth creation.  Society needs competing or companion institutions that more fully 
acknowledge ecosystems as the source of life creation.  Only in recent decades has 
humanity begun to understand the full range of ecosystem services provided to human 
society.  Future adaptation to climate change will surely require a broad-scale approach, 
integrating not only atmospheric science but also ecosystem science as several terrestrial 
and marine ecosystems function as important carbon sinks.  The necessity of high quality 
information for decision-making on global climate issues may provide a future policy 
window whereby a national ecological indicator system gains traction. 
 Whether CEQ is a capable home for such endeavors will remain to be seen.  As 
acknowledged earlier, locating any new initiative in CEQ carries risks.  It has not been a 
well understood or supported institution of federal government.  It is, however, entirely 
unique in federal government with its institutionalization of local ecological impacts in 
Title I and a comprehensive mandate in Title II.  The challenges of comprehensiveness 
have been well documented in this paper using NEPA as a case example and in a range of 
planning and policy literature.  NEPA nor its drafters deserve blame for the difficulty of 
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implementing comprehensive policy.  Yet as Chapter Four reveals, a demand for 
comprehensiveness exists.  Structured properly, a comprehensive ecological information 
system would improve the Nation’s overall understanding of the environment and may 
foster better decision-making. 
In many ways, NEPA and CEQ have already made their contribution to 
environmental science and policy.  The creation of environmental impact analysis has 
prompted numerous other efforts in measuring, conceptualizing, and managing 
environmental problems.  An entire field of practice and study was initiated with the 
passage of NEPA and a new national policy focus created (Bartlett 1985a).  A history of 
the evolution of environmental impact analysis appears to be missing from environmental 
science and policy scholarship.  This history would be a useful contribution.  Though 
such a history was not the analytical focus of this project, it deserves full 
acknowledgement.  And while this thesis may read as overly critical of NEPA at times, it 
does so out of respect for this statute and its importance to humanity and the planet which 
sustains it.  The statute confronts issues which will no doubt increase in scale, 
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Appendix A: The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
 
 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended  
(Pub. L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, January 1, 1970, as amended by Pub. L. 94-52, July 3, 
1975, Pub. L. 94-83, August 9, 1975, and Pub. L. 97-258, § 4(b), Sept. 13, 1982) 
An Act to establish a national policy for the environment, to provide for the establishment of a 
Council on Environmental Quality, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969." 
Purpose 
Sec. 2 [42 USC § 4321]. 
The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and 
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or 
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; 
to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the 
Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.  
 
TITLE I 
CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATION OF NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Sec. 101 [42 USC § 4331]. 
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all 
components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of population growth, 
high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding 
technological advances and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and 
maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, declares that it 
is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local 
governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means 
and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and 
promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can 
exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present 
and future generations of Americans. 
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of the 
Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations 
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of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources 
to the end that the Nation may -- 
1. fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding 
generations; 
2. assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally 
pleasing surroundings; 
3. attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to 
health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; 
4. preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and 
maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity, and variety of 
individual choice; 
5. achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards 
of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and  
6. enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable 
recycling of depletable resources. 
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment and that 
each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the 
environment. 
 
Sec. 102 [42 USC § 4332]. 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, 
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in 
accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government 
shall -- 
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of 
the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in 
decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environment; 
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on 
Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act, which will insure that presently 
unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration 
in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations; 
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other 
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a 
detailed statement by the responsible official on -- 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the 
proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and  
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(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with 
and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special 
expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement 
and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which 
are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available 
to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by 
section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and shall accompany the proposal through the 
existing agency review processes; 
(D) Any detailed statement required under subparagraph (C) after January 1, 1970, for 
any major Federal action funded under a program of grants to States shall not be 
deemed to be legally insufficient solely by reason of having been prepared by a State 
agency or official, if: 
(i) the State agency or official has statewide jurisdiction and has the responsibility 
for such action, 
(ii) the responsible Federal official furnishes guidance and participates in such 
preparation, 
(iii) the responsible Federal official independently evaluates such statement prior 
to its approval and adoption, and  
(iv) after January 1, 1976, the responsible Federal official provides early 
notification to, and solicits the views of, any other State or any Federal land 
management entity of any action or any alternative thereto which may have 
significant impacts upon such State or affected Federal land management entity 
and, if there is any disagreement on such impacts, prepares a written 
assessment of such impacts and views for incorporation into such detailed 
statement. 
The procedures in this subparagraph shall not relieve the Federal official of his 
responsibilities for the scope, objectivity, and content of the entire statement or of any 
other responsibility under this Act; and further, this subparagraph does not affect the legal 
sufficiency of statements prepared by State agencies with less than statewide jurisdiction. 
(E) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of 
action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of 
available resources; 
(F) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, 
where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to 
initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in 
anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment; 
(G) make available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and individuals, advice 
and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality of the 
environment; 
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(H) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and development of 
resource-oriented projects; and 
(I) assist the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act. 
Sec. 103 [42 USC § 4333]. 
All agencies of the Federal Government shall review their present statutory authority, 
administrative regulations, and current policies and procedures for the purpose of determining 
whether there are any deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit full compliance with 
the purposes and provisions of this Act and shall propose to the President not later than July 1, 
1971, such measures as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies into conformity 
with the intent, purposes, and procedures set forth in this Act. 
Sec. 104 [42 USC § 4334]. 
Nothing in section 102 [42 USC § 4332] or 103 [42 USC § 4333] shall in any way affect the 
specific statutory obligations of any Federal agency (1) to comply with criteria or standards of 
environmental quality, (2) to coordinate or consult with any other Federal or State agency, or (3) 
to act, or refrain from acting contingent upon the recommendations or certification of any other 
Federal or State agency. 
Sec. 105 [42 USC § 4335]. 
The policies and goals set forth in this Act are supplementary to those set forth in existing 
authorizations of Federal agencies. 
TITLE II 
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
Sec. 201 [42 USC § 4341]. 
The President shall transmit to the Congress annually beginning July 1, 1970, an Environmental 
Quality Report (hereinafter referred to as the "report") which shall set forth (1) the status and 
condition of the major natural, manmade, or altered environmental classes of the Nation, 
including, but not limited to, the air, the aquatic, including marine, estuarine, and fresh water, and 
the terrestrial environment, including, but not limited to, the forest, dryland, wetland, range, urban, 
suburban an rural environment; (2) current and foreseeable trends in the quality, management 
and utilization of such environments and the effects of those trends on the social, economic, and 
other requirements of the Nation; (3) the adequacy of available natural resources for fulfilling 
human and economic requirements of the Nation in the light of expected population pressures; 
(4) a review of the programs and activities (including regulatory activities) of the Federal 
Government, the State and local governments, and nongovernmental entities or individuals with 
particular reference to their effect on the environment and on the conservation, development and 
utilization of natural resources; and (5) a program for remedying the deficiencies of existing 
programs and activities, together with recommendations for legislation. 
Sec. 202 [42 USC § 4342]. 
 87 
There is created in the Executive Office of the President a Council on Environmental Quality 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Council"). The Council shall be composed of three members who 
shall be appointed by the President to serve at his pleasure, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. The President shall designate one of the members of the Council to serve as 
Chairman. Each member shall be a person who, as a result of his training, experience, and 
attainments, is exceptionally well qualified to analyze and interpret environmental trends and 
information of all kinds; to appraise programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light 
of the policy set forth in title I of this Act; to be conscious of and responsive to the scientific, 
economic, social, aesthetic, and cultural needs and interests of the Nation; and to formulate and 
recommend national policies to promote the improvement of the quality of the environment. 
Sec. 203 [42 USC § 4343].  
(a) The Council may employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out its 
functions under this Act. In addition, the Council may employ and fix the compensation of such 
experts and consultants as may be necessary for the carrying out of its functions under this Act, 
in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code (but without regard to the last 
sentence thereof). 
(b) Notwithstanding section 1342 of Title 31, the Council may accept and employ voluntary and 
uncompensated services in furtherance of the purposes of the Council. 
Sec. 204 [42 USC § 4344]. 
It shall be the duty and function of the Council -- 
1. to assist and advise the President in the preparation of the Environmental Quality Report 
required by section 201 [42 USC § 4341] of this title; 
2. to gather timely and authoritative information concerning the conditions and trends in the 
quality of the environment both current and prospective, to analyze and interpret such 
information for the purpose of determining whether such conditions and trends are 
interfering, or are likely to interfere, with the achievement of the policy set forth in title I of 
this Act, and to compile and submit to the President studies relating to such conditions 
and trends; 
3. to review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government in 
the light of the policy set forth in title I of this Act for the purpose of determining the extent 
to which such programs and activities are contributing to the achievement of such policy, 
and to make recommendations to the President with respect thereto;  
4. to develop and recommend to the President national policies to foster and promote the 
improvement of environmental quality to meet the conservation, social, economic, health, 
and other requirements and goals of the Nation; 
5. to conduct investigations, studies, surveys, research, and analyses relating to ecological 
systems and environmental quality; 
6. to document and define changes in the natural environment, including the plant and 
animal systems, and to accumulate necessary data and other information for a continuing 
analysis of these changes or trends and an interpretation of their underlying causes; 
7. to report at least once each year to the President on the state and condition of the 
environment; and 
8. to make and furnish such studies, reports thereon, and recommendations with respect to 
matters of policy and legislation as the President may request. 
Sec. 205 [42 USC § 4345]. 
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In exercising its powers, functions, and duties under this Act, the Council shall -- 
1. consult with the Citizens' Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality established by 
Executive Order No. 11472, dated May 29, 1969, and with such representatives of 
science, industry, agriculture, labor, conservation organizations, State and local 
governments and other groups, as it deems advisable; and 
2. utilize, to the fullest extent possible, the services, facilities and information (including 
statistical information) of public and private agencies and organizations, and individuals, 
in order that duplication of effort and expense may be avoided, thus assuring that the 
Council's activities will not unnecessarily overlap or conflict with similar activities 
authorized by law and performed by established agencies. 
Sec. 206 [42 USC § 4346]. 
Members of the Council shall serve full time and the Chairman of the Council shall be 
compensated at the rate provided for Level II of the Executive Schedule Pay Rates [5 USC § 
5313]. The other members of the Council shall be compensated at the rate provided for Level IV 
of the Executive Schedule Pay Rates [5 USC § 5315]. 
Sec. 207 [42 USC § 4346a]. 
The Council may accept reimbursements from any private nonprofit organization or from any 
department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, any State, or local 
government, for the reasonable travel expenses incurred by an officer or employee of the Council 
in connection with his attendance at any conference, seminar, or similar meeting conducted for 
the benefit of the Council. 
Sec. 208 [42 USC § 4346b]. 
The Council may make expenditures in support of its international activities, including 
expenditures for: (1) international travel; (2) activities in implementation of international 
agreements; and (3) the support of international exchange programs in the United States and in 
foreign countries. 
Sec. 209 [42 USC § 4347]. 
There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of this chapter not to exceed 
$300,000 for fiscal year 1970, $700,000 for fiscal year 1971, and $1,000,000 for each fiscal year 
thereafter. 
The Environmental Quality Improvement Act, as amended (Pub. L. No. 91- 224, Title II, April 
3, 1970; Pub. L. No. 97-258, September 13, 1982; and Pub. L. No. 98-581, October 30, 1984. 
42 USC § 4372.  
(a) There is established in the Executive Office of the President an office to be known as 
the Office of Environmental Quality (hereafter in this chapter referred to as the "Office"). 
The Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality established by Public Law 91-190 
shall be the Director of the Office. There shall be in the Office a Deputy Director who shall 
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
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(b) The compensation of the Deputy Director shall be fixed by the President at a rate not 
in excess of the annual rate of compensation payable to the Deputy Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget. 
(c) The Director is authorized to employ such officers and employees (including experts 
and consultants) as may be necessary to enable the Office to carry out its functions 
;under this chapter and Public Law 91-190, except that he may employ no more than ten 
specialists and other experts without regard to the provisions of Title 5, governing 
appointments in the competitive service, and pay such specialists and experts without 
regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title 
relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, but no such specialist or expert 
shall be paid at a rate in excess of the maximum rate for GS-18 of the General Schedule 
under section 5332 of Title 5. 
(d) In carrying out his functions the Director shall assist and advise the President on 
policies and programs of the Federal Government affecting environmental quality by -- 
1. providing the professional and administrative staff and support for the Council on 
Environmental Quality established by Public Law 91- 190; 
2. assisting the Federal agencies and departments in appraising the effectiveness 
of existing and proposed facilities, programs, policies, and activities of the 
Federal Government, and those specific major projects designated by the 
President which do not require individual project authorization by Congress, 
which affect environmental quality; 
3. reviewing the adequacy of existing systems for monitoring and predicting 
environmental changes in order to achieve effective coverage and efficient use of 
research facilities and other resources; 
4. promoting the advancement of scientific knowledge of the effects of actions and 
technology on the environment and encouraging the development of the means 
to prevent or reduce adverse effects that endanger the health and well-being of 
man; 
5. assisting in coordinating among the Federal departments and agencies those 
programs and activities which affect, protect, and improve environmental quality; 
6. assisting the Federal departments and agencies in the development and 
interrelationship of environmental quality criteria and standards established 
throughout the Federal Government;  
7. collecting, collating, analyzing, and interpreting data and information on 
environmental quality, ecological research, and evaluation. 
(e) The Director is authorized to contract with public or private agencies, institutions, and 
organizations and with individuals without regard to section 3324(a) and (b) of Title 31 
and section 5 of Title 41 in carrying out his functions. 
42 USC § 4373. Each Environmental Quality Report required by Public Law 91-190 shall, upon 
transmittal to Congress, be referred to each standing committee having jurisdiction over any part 
of the subject matter of the Report. 
42 USC § 4374. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated for the operations of the Office 
of Environmental Quality and the Council on Environmental Quality not to exceed the following 
sums for the following fiscal years which sums are in addition to those contained in Public Law 
91- 190: 
(a) $2,126,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979. 
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(b) $3,000,000 for the fiscal years ending September 30, 1980, and September 30, 1981. 
(c) $44,000 for the fiscal years ending September 30, 1982, 1983, and 1984. 
(d) $480,000 for each of the fiscal years ending September 30, 1985 and 1986. 
42 USC § 4375.  
(a) There is established an Office of Environmental Quality Management Fund 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Fund") to receive advance payments from other agencies 
or accounts that may be used solely to finance -- 
1. study contracts that are jointly sponsored by the Office and one or more other 
Federal agencies; and 
2. Federal interagency environmental projects (including task forces) in which the 
Office participates. 
(b) Any study contract or project that is to be financed under subsection (a) of this section 
may be initiated only with the approval of the Director. 
(c) The Director shall promulgate regulations setting forth policies and procedures for 

















Appendix B: Summary Matrix of Ecological Indicator Proposals, 1997-2007 













Integrating The Nation’s 
Environmental Monitoring and 
Research Networks and 
Programs: A Proposed 
Framework 
no, scales and 
objectives of 
monitoring 
none slight mention 
1999 Heinz Center Designing a Report on the State 
of the Nation’s Ecosystems. 
yes, 11 core 
indicators in 4 
categories 
none no, clearly 
avoided 
2002 Heinz Center The State of the Nation’s 
Ecosystems: Measuring the 
Lands, Waters, and Living 
Resources of the United States. 
yes, 11 core 
indicators in 4 
categories 





Ecological Indicators for the 
Nation 
yes, 11 core 
indicators in 3 
categories 
EPA very slight 
mention 
2003 EPA Draft Report on the Environment 
Technical Document 
yes, 7 ecosystem 
classes proposed 
with 6-10 metrics 
per class 
EPA No 
2004 GAO Environmental Indicators: Better 
Coordination is Needed to 
Develop Environmental Indicator 
Sets that Inform Decisions 
no, report surveys 
past efforts and 
contains in-depth 
process discussion 





Green Compass: Institutional 
Options for Developing a 
National System of 
Environmental Indicators 











EF/person Carbon Cropland Grazing land Forest Fishing Ground Built land 
Income Groups                 
High Income Group 972.0 6.4 4.04 1.15 0.28 0.61 0.17 0.13
Middle Income Group 3,099.0 2.2 1 0.62 0.22 0.18 0.09 0.08
Low Income Group 2,371.0 1 0.26 0.44 0.09 0.15 0.02 0.05
                  
Regions                 
Africa 902.0 1.4 0.26 0.54 0.25 0.24 0.03 0.05
Middle East & Central Asia 365.6 2.3 1.34 0.69 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.08
Asia-Pacific 3,562.0 1.6 0.78 0.49 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.06
Latin America & Caribbean 553.2 2.4 0.65 0.57 0.72 0.32 0.1 0.08
North America 330.5 9.2 6.21 1.42 0.32 1.02 0.11 0.1
Europe - EU 487.3 4.7 2.58 1.17 0.19 0.48 0.1 0.17
Europe - Non-EU 239.6 3.5 2 0.94 0.04 0.29 0.17 0.07
                  
Countries                 
United States (2nd Highest) 298.2 9.4 6.51 1.38 0.9 1.02 0.1 0.1
United Arab Emirates (High) 4.5 9.5 7.82 1.03 0.03 0.37 0.21 0
Nicaragua (at biocapacity) 5.5 2 0.41 0.4 0.71 0.35 0.1 0.07
Afghanistan (2nd Low) 29.9 0.5 0 0.27 0.1 0.05 0 0.06
Malawi (Low) 12.9 0.5 0.07 0.21 0 0.15 0 0.03
China 1,323.3 2.1 1.13 0.56 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.07
                  
World 6,476.0 2.7 1.41 0.64 0.26 0.23 0.09 0.07
 
Source: World Wildlife Fund. Living Planet Report 2008. Gland, Switzerland: Repress. 
